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ABSTRACT 
 The Brazilian Air Force (FAB), through the Aeronautics Directorate of Education, 
executes twelve categories of courses to educate and train career officers and temporary 
officers. However, a look at the professional training of junior officers reveals 
shortcomings, especially concerning the teaching of military ethics. The document 
defining the professional profile of FAB officers, Professional Profile of Aeronautical 
Officers (PPOA), does not make clear distinctions about the ethical aspects associated 
with the combatant role of each specialty. Therefore, the PPOA does not define the 
attitudes, values, and skills necessary for the performance of the guard and security 
missions executed by all junior officers or warfare missions performed by career officers. 
Moreover, there is no conceptual and intellectual agreement in FAB about the 
competencies that characterize a military professional, nor any definitions about the roles 
that this professional should play in society. This thesis demonstrates that the curricula of 
the FAB courses for officers, in the military field, must be modified to meet the demands 
of the mission to be performed, which is evolving from a traditional profile to a hybrid 
war profile. Also, the thesis identifies the necessary balance between technical and 
military knowledge, demonstrating that ethical and moral education is the nucleus that 
connects all classes and specialties within the FAB. 
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1 
I. THE PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF BRAZILIAN AIR FORCE 
JUNIOR OFFICERS 
A glance at the professional education of Brazilian Air Force (FAB) junior officers 
reveals several gaps, particularly regarding the teaching of military ethics. The FAB has 
no manual that establishes the teaching of necessary methodologies and techniques to build 
the ethical professional profile of commissioned officers and temporary officers1 as 
required by the officers’ various specialties, such as technicians (including pedagogues, 
lawyers, and journalists),2 physicians, pharmacists, and veterinarians.3 Everything that 
must be transmitted to these officers is contemplated in the curricula of the courses, but 
much of the teaching of ethics linked to the organizational culture is carried out in the daily 
activities. These routines, although they constitute an informal curriculum, are not 
regulated centrally by the responsible organizations. In addition, the document that sets the 
Professional Profile of Aeronautical Officers (PPOA)4 does not make clear distinctions 
regarding the ethical aspects associated with the combat role of each specialty—and thus 
fails to define the attitudes, values, and abilities needed either for protection and security 
duty (required for all junior officers) or the role of warfighting (required for all 
commissioned officers).5 
Furthermore, there is no conceptual and intellectual agreement in Brazil regarding 
the definition—or requirements—of a professional soldier. The only description of a 
                                                 
1 The Complementary Officers Table, which refers to the Temporary Officer, is designed to complete 
Career Officer Charts, consisting of personnel graduated by higher education establishments, in courses 
officially recognized, in accordance with federal legislation, that meet to the requirements established by 
Decree 85.866 of April 1, 1981. 
2 Comando da Aeronáutica, Currículo Mínimo da Primeira fase do Estágio de Adaptação Técnico 
[Minimum Curriculum of the First Phase of the Technical Adaptation Stage] (EAT), ICA 37–239 (Brasília, 
DF: Comando da Aeronáutica, 2015). 
3 Comando da Aeronáutica, Currículo Mínimo da Primeira fase do Estágio de Adaptação e Serviço 
[Minimum Curriculum of the First Stage of the Adaptation and Service Internship] (EAS), ICA 37–393 
(Brasília, DF: Comando da Aeronáutica, 2015).  
4 Comando da Aeronáutica, Perfil Profissional do Oficial da Aeronáutica [Professional Profile of 
Aeronautical Officers] (PPOA), MCA 36–7 (Brasília, DF: Comando da Aeronáutica, 2012). 
5 Richard Gabriel, To Serve with Honor: A Treatise on Military Ethics and the Way of the Soldier 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 81. 
2 
professional soldier or of military ethos mostly concerns the soldier as a combatant and 
stems almost exclusively from the experience of the older officers: the inheritance of an 
obsolete organizational culture. Although using older officers as a source of professional 
development is valid in several aspects, such as to reinforce critical institutional values,6 it 
often does not reflect true, objective, professional education and accumulation of 
knowledge or expertise. In addition, relying on older officers to educate and train the new 
ones delays curriculum development; older officers tend to resist change. 
Moreover, because the professional experience of the older officers generally 
reflects their personal perceptions and those of other older officers, changes in the officer 
training policy mostly depend on personal opinions and views rather than objective 
profession-related requirements. The lack of an established military ethos and these 
practices prevent adequate continuity in the educational process to provide improvement 
and allow for standardization, proportionality, and balance between the military officers’ 
specialties. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis attempts to answer the following research question: How can the 
Brazilian Air Force best adapt its existing military ethics-related curricula to help junior 
officers increase professionalism7 and, therefore, ensure personnel readiness for their 
combat missions?  
This thesis demonstrates that the FAB’s academic curricula, in the military field, 
must be modified to meet mission operational demands. Also, it identifies the necessary 
balance between technical and academic knowledge, demonstrating that ethical formation 
is the core that connects all classes and ranks inside the Brazilian Air Force. 
                                                 
6 Tania Godoy, “Educação aos Militares Após a Ditadura” [Education for Military after Dictatorship], 
XXVI Simpósio Nacional de História, July 17–22, 2011, http://www.snh2011.anpuh.org/resources/anais/
14/1300881345_ARQUIVO_TextoANPUHTaniaRPGodoy.pdf. 
7 Professionalism is understood in terms of expertise, corporateness, and responsibility, all of them 
applied in a specific jurisdiction and with social legitimacy. 
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B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The investigation of the FAB’s military ethics and military ethics curricula is 
fundamental to the armed forces and the nation because of its practical implications. Since 
2016, the FAB has been undergoing a period of restructuring and modernization to become 
more efficient. Achieving efficiency and effectiveness calls for developing a professional 
military capable of fulfilling the range of assigned missions at a reduced cost. In this 
connection, FAB’s goal to be recognized internationally as an Operational and Combat Air 
Force requires coordination and cooperation among the three military branches, and, on an 
international level, requires coordination and cooperation of these branches with the armed 
forces of allied nations. In this context, this thesis will be useful to policy makers and the 
FAB because it seeks to identify specific steps, themes, and areas to improve the Brazilian 
Air Force’s curricula aimed at modernizing the FAB and helping it fulfill new missions 
effectively. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To elaborate a coherent analysis of the social framework of the current military 
culture in Brazil, its values, priorities, and interpretations of professionalism, four specific 
areas are studied. These four directly influence the curriculum of the training courses for 
FAB’s officers. The objective of this broad analysis is to achieve a complete picture of the 
creation of the military character today, how this character influences the development of 
ethics and professionalism in the barracks and, consequently, the definition of the ideal 
type of officer (professional military) that will guide the curricula of the training courses 
to officers. 
First, this thesis analyzes the literature that discusses military professionalism to 
verify the conformity of military teaching in the Brazilian Air Force. The beginning of the 
research seeks to establish the necessary definitions for the understanding of the nature of 
the military profession. Then, this thesis reviews the literature on traditions of 
organizational culture, which is also very important when analyzing the military history 
of a nation.  
4 
1. On Military Professionalism 
For this aspect, the first work that I analyze is The Soldier and the State: The Theory 
and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, by Samuel Huntington. In this book, the author 
introduces the idea that civil-military relations are based on a balance of political power, 
with the military participating in that process as a professional body.8 
Not necessarily a counterpoint, but a different approach to what Huntington 
presents is presented by Charles Moskos and Frank Wood in The Military: More Than Just 
a Job?9 Moskos and Wood are more incisive in establishing the uniqueness of the military 
profession by stating that although the military maintains its autonomy, society modifies 
the armed forces.10 For Moskos and Wood, the armed forces would be moving from an 
institutional profile to an occupational one.11 
To balance the ideas of Huntington, Moskos and Woods, this thesis uses the book 
The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, by Morris Janowitz, one of the 
first sociologists to examine the military with this lens.12 He analyzes the demographic 
evolution of the military, emphasizing changes in society and the advancement of 
technology as causes of change within the military. For Janowitz, despite the social 
pressures that derive from occupationalism, the spirit of the warrior remains alive as a 
necessity for the survival of the institution in the fulfillment of its social mission.13 
To finish this first part of the analysis, I consider The Future of the Army Profession, 
edited by Don Snider, Gayle Watkins, and Lloyd Matthews. This work is a collection of 
essays by several authors with extensive experience in the military field and is divided into 
                                                 
8 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2000), 3 and 7. 
9 Charles Moskos and Frank Wood, The Military: More than Just a Job? (Washington, DC: Pergamon-
Brassey’s, 1988), 3. 
10 Moskos and Wood, 3. 
11 Moskos and Wood, 3–4. 
12 “The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait,” Goodreads, August 28, 2018, 
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/1402264.The_Professional_Soldier. 
13 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 
2017), 31–36. 
5 
seven different sections: Setting the Stage, The Profession’s Military-Technical Expert 
Knowledge, The Political-Social Arena, Ethics and the Army Profession, Professional 
Leadership, Internal Expertise and Institutional Management, and Conclusions. The 
sections on which this thesis focuses are Section I - Setting the Stage, concerning 
professionalism; Section IV - Ethics and the Army Profession, regarding ethics; and 
Section V - Professional Leadership and Section VI - Internal Expertise and Institutional 
Management, about education. 
Subsequently, I analyze the literature that explains how the armed forces 
incorporate moral values and create their Code of Ethics, which reinforce many of the 
paradigms and mythologies that underpin the role played by the military in Brazil. 
2. On Military Ethics 
A second body of literature discusses and analyzes military ethics. The first step is 
to evaluate the concept of universal and absolute values and their applicability, based on 
the book The Abolition of Man,14 by C.S. Lewis, which attempts to persuade the reader of 
the importance and relevance of universal values like honesty and veracity in contemporary 
society.15 
Some ethicists discuss values in the armed forces. True Faith and Allegiance: The 
Burden of Military Ethics, by Dr. James H. Toner, highlights the imperative need for a 
moral construction of the soldier’s personality; To Serve with Honor: The Treatise on 
Military Ethics and the Way of the Soldier, by Richard A. Gabriel, states that the military 
profession is qualitatively different from any other profession and has been “contaminated” 
by commercial and civilian standards, prejudicing its capabilities.16 
Both works not only analyze the military moral precepts in contrast to the moral 
standards of society, but also establish professional foundations based on this concept. This 
will be essential in creating a connection with the issue raised in the first part of the 
                                                 
14 I use the Portuguese version of this book. 
15 C.S. Lewis, A Abolição do Homem [The Abolition of Man] (São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2005), 10, 
33–34, 37–38. 
16 Gabriel, xiii. 
6 
analysis, about the institutional organization—attached to military values, being influenced 
by civilian precepts and occupational organization—related to social market values. 
Returning to the book The Future of the Army Profession, but this time focusing on 
Section IV - Ethics and the Army Profession, I confirm that morality is essential and helps 
to improve general competencies. The author of the first essay, John Mattox, asserts, as 
well as does Toner,17 that military professionals must have competence and character. They 
must be moral and technically skillful leaders.18  
3. On Military Education 
The next step is to extract from the existing literature how Brazilian military 
education reflects this social construct and this code of ethics. The idea of moral education 
is developed in the book Lawrence Kohlberg: Ética e Educação Moral (Lawrence 
Kohlberg: Ethics and Moral Education), by Angela Biaggio.19 Kohlberg’s theoretical work 
reconciles philosophy with psychology in the study of morality and establishes practical 
applications for moral education in education organizations.20 
Military Education: Past, Present, and Future, by Gregory C. Kennedy and Keith 
Nielson, examines the “past failures and successes in the area of military education in the 
hope that the knowledge that history provides of such experiences will help modern 
military institutions to gain understanding of … what can and cannot be done.”21 The idea 
of preparing leaders and not only warriors is central in military education. Any planned 
military course should focus its structure to impart experience through the study of military 
                                                 
17 James H. Toner, True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military Ethics (Lexington: The 
University Press of Kentucky, 1995), 53–54. 
18 Don Snider, Gayle Watkins, and Lloyd Matthews, The Future of the Army Profession (Boston: 
McGraw-Hill Primis, 2002), 291–292. 
19 Angela Biaggio, Lawrence Kohlberg: Ética e Educação Moral [Ethics and Moral Education] (São 
Paulo: Moderna, 2002), 11. 
20 Biaggio, 11–12. 
21 Gregory Kennedy and Keith Neilson, Military Education: Past, Present, and Future (Westport, CT: 
Prager, 2002), xi. 
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history.22 The authors agree with Toner about the military being a critical institution of the 
state machine, and that military education should be a government priority.23 
In Section V - Professional Leadership Section of The Future of the Army 
Profession, the author of the article “Reality Check: The Human and Spiritual Needs of 
Soldiers and How to Prepare them for Combat,” John Brinsfield, declares that the rise in 
spirituality and religiosity must be seen as a natural expression of human beings and 
culture, and is a tool for the improvement of the military as a profession.24 These statements 
are strengthened with Lewis’s concepts of universal morality and Toner’s statement about 
transcendental truth as the origin of military morality.25 
On the other hand, Joe LeBoeuf, in his case study “The 2000 Army Training and 
Leader Development Panel,” argues that an education system must adapt to the operational 
needs of this new century.26 He traces the need for a continuing education system and states 
that the focus of this new military education must be on full-spectrum operations.27 
4. On Traditions and Organizational Culture 
Finally, I analyze the existing literature on the social structure of the Brazilian 
Armed Forces from its creation to the present, verifying how history has shaped the military 
and the relationship between barracks and society, establishing a link between the 
development of the curricula and all previous information collected.  
In their book A Invenção das Tradições (The Invention of Traditions), Eric J. 
Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger discuss habits or behaviors that, for various reasons, are 
                                                 
22 Kennedy and Neilson, 85, 99. 
23 Kennedy and Neilson, ix. 
24 John Brinsfield, “Reality Check: The Human and Spiritual Needs of Soldiers and How to Prepare 
Them for Combat,” in The Future of the Army Profession, ed. Don Snider, Gayle Watkins, and Lloyd 
Matthews (Boston: McGraw-Hill Primis, 2002), 400–405. 
25 James Toner, “A Message to Garcia: Leading Soldiers in Moral Mayhem,” in The Future of the 
Army Profession, ed. Don Snider, Gayle Watkins, and Lloyd Matthews (Boston: McGraw-Hill Primis, 
2002), 317. 
26 Joe LeBoeuf, “Case No. 3: The 2000 Army Training and Leader Development Panel,” in The Future 
of the Army Profession, ed. Don Snider, Gayle Watkins, and Lloyd Matthews (Boston: McGraw-Hill 
Primis, 2002), 493. 
27 LeBoeuf, 493. 
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absorbed in some societies as if they were part of the cultural heritage, when in fact they were 
created more recently according to state objectives. Similarly, the authors consider that the 
teaching system of an armed force is a result of its traditions and values.28 Hobsbawm 
notes that the invented traditions fall into three overlapping categories: a) those that 
establish social cohesion in and the conditions of admission to a group; b) those that 
establish or legitimize institutions, status, or relations of authority, and c) those that 
promote socialization, the inculcation of ideas, value systems, and behavior patterns.29  
Hobsbawm affirms that “invented tradition” is a set of practices, usually 
regulated by rules or openly accepted, which seek to inculcate specific values and 
norms of behavior through repetition, practices, ritual, or symbols, evoking continuity 
with the past. In fact, whenever possible, attempts are made to establish continuity with 
an appropriate historical past.30 In short, “they are reactions to new situations that 
either take the form of reference to previous situations or establish their own past 
through almost obligatory repetition.”31 
In Hobsbawm’s view, the invented traditions differ from customs since the goal 
of such traditions is invariability. They impose fixed (usually formalized) practices, 
such as repetition.32 The custom, he maintains, cannot be invariant, because life is not 
so even in orthodox societies.33 In Hobsbawm’s view, there is also an apparent 
difference between invented tradition and convention or routine.34 He posits that social 
practice that must be repeated frequently, for convenience and greater efficiency, 
generates a certain number of conventions and routines to facilitate the transmission 
of custom.35 Unlike traditions, he reflects, conventions have no relevant symbolic 
                                                 
28 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, A Invenção das Tradições [The Invention of Traditions] (Rio 
de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1997), 21. 
29 Hobsbawm and Ranger, 17. 
30 Hobsbawm and Ranger, 9. 
31 Hobsbawm and Ranger, 10. 
32 Hobsbawm and Ranger, 10. 
33 Hobsbawm and Ranger, 10. 
34 Hobsbawm and Ranger, 11. 
35 Hobsbawm and Ranger, 11. 
9 
function, and their functions and technical justifications are not ideological.36 With this 
in mind, it is easier to determine the origin of the process of inventing traditions in the 
case of officially instituted and planned ceremonials, provided they are well 
documented, such as the construction of Nazi symbolism, especially in the SS, for 
example.37 Typically, this type of practice looks to the society’s past for a repertoire 
of elements composed of florid language, as well as symbolic practices and 
communications.38 Thus, political institutions, ideological movements, and groups 
without predecessors use the invention of historical continuity through the creation of 
an ancient past that goes beyond real historical continuity, whether by legend or 
invention, seeking to legitimize and strengthen its organization.39 
This is corroborated by the work of the anthropologist Mauro Celso Castro, in his 
book A Invenção do Exército Brasileiro (The Invention of the Brazilian Army), which 
explains some traditions and norms that helped to build the culture of the Brazilian Armed 
Forces.40 Castro stresses that traditions are cultural constructs necessary for individuals 
to interpret and classify reality.41 Castro assumes that the symbols and rituals of the 
Brazilian Army, in the sense that they were not a natural expression of the military 
institution, were rather an institutional movement orchestrated to strengthen specific 
values.42 He further notes that these ceremonies and symbols allow, through the 
evocation of the past, for the building of the social identity of the army and for the 
development of the feeling that the army is perennially in opposition to social change, 
defining the moral values that are dear to it and forging its organizational culture.43 
                                                 
36 Hobsbawm and Ranger, 11. 
37 Hobsbawm and Ranger, 12. 
38 Hobsbawm and Ranger, 14 
39 Hobsbawm and Ranger, 15. 
40 Mauro Celso Castro, A invenção do Exército Brasileiro [The Invention of the Brazilian Army] (Rio 
de Janeiro: Zahar, 2002), 7. 
41 Castro, 7. 
42 Castro, 7. 
43 Castro, 7. 
10 
Castro makes it clear that the term “invention” does not point to something false 
or fake, as opposed to an authentic or true tradition. For him, it is a phenomenon found 
in the most diverse countries and historical contexts, recognizing that all traditions are 
true. The distinction is between those traditions that are inherited naturally and those 
that are mastered and created. In Castro’s words, “common to all cases would be the 
attempt to express identity, cohesion and social stability amid situations of rapid 
historical transformation, through the use of the invention of ceremonies and symbols 
that evoke continuity with an often-ideal or mythical past.”44 
Two clear examples of this dynamic are the institution of the Duke of Caxias 
as patron of the Brazilian Army and the creation of the mythical war against the 
communists represented in the ceremonial commemoration of the defeat of the 
Communist Intentona. Both symbols—the Intentona and the Duke of Caxias—
emerged in the troubled 1920s and 1930s. It was not by chance that this happened. The 
whole period was marked by deep divisions inside the Brazilian Armed Forces, 
inherited from the 1889 coup that ended the monarchical regime and established the 
republic in Brazil.45 
In short, the literature suggests that inherited and invented traditions exist 
mutually and provide a service to help organizations accommodate a set of institutional 
values that are considered essential for their existence. 
The information given by Castro concerning culture in the FAB as an inheritance 
of the culture of the Brazilian Army and the Navy is fleshed out in Shawn C. Smallman’s 
book Fear and Memory in the Brazilian Army and Society, 1889–1954, which focuses on 
almost half a century of the history of the Brazilian Army (EB).46 One part of this book is 
especially useful to address facts directly connected with the traditions created inside the 
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Brazilian Armed Forces. Another part underpins Appendix A, to complement information 
about military history in Brazil. 
The fourth book that I use is Antropologia dos Militares: Reflexões sobre pesquisas 
de campo (Anthropology of the Military: Reflections on Field Research), edited by Mauro 
Celso Castro and Piero Leirner, in which diverse authors investigate how the military 
identity and its world understanding are constructed. Castro himself confirms Smallman’s 
view about the military personnel’s distrust of the ability of civilians to lead the nation, 
since it is clear that the militaries are considered intellectually, socially, and morally 
superior because of their institution.47 In the same book, the small rituals, ceremonies, and 
physical expressions (haircut style, for example) are demonstrated to be essential in the 
construction of this institutional identity.48 
Finally, in closing the review of the literary research used in this work, I consider 
Socialização em uma Instituição Total: Implicações da Educação em uma Academia 
Militar (Socialization in a Total Institution: Implications of Education in a Military 
Academy), a thesis by Giuliana Franco Leal, in order to analyze the institutional 
characteristics presented in the Brazilian Army. Leal discusses the process of secondary 
socialization of cadets in the Brazilian Air Force.49 The analysis demonstrates that the 
author directly confirms Castro’s theories. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
I hypothesize that the Brazilian Air Force must establish a clear, fundamental 
military ethos with which to guide professional curricula development for both temporary 
and commissioned officers. These two professional profiles are very close in the military 
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aspect; however, the temporary officer performs activities related mainly to the security of 
the facilities and is not involved in combat activities. Nonetheless, temporary officers need 
an ethos—an ethical basis through which to understand their actions and mission, as do 
commissioned officers. 
Today, officers’ training courses do not clearly define what knowledge, skills, and 
attitudes form the core of the profession, which differs from training for other professions. 
Therefore, such knowledge, attitudes, and skills must be incorporated into the process of 
institutionalization. Thus, I hypothesize that ethical education, based on universal values, 
must precede technical and academic education, and the FAB curricula must be adapted so 
that the officers reach Kohlberg’s post-conventional moral stages. I also hypothesize that 
the FAB curricula needs to reflect a balance between the institutional and occupational 
model, and military professionals have to be prepared to fulfill missions in an air force with 
a constabulary force profile, to fight in irregular and hybrid warfare. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter II introduces the research question and analyzes the concepts related to 
military professionalism, establishing how these theories relate to each other through a 
detailed literature review. My purpose is to determine factors that create a professional of 
war and whether we can consider temporary officers as entirely or partially included in that 
concept. 
Focusing on ethics, Chapter III addresses the concepts linked to ethics, morals, and 
values, starting from these concepts in a universal aspect and particularizing them in the 
military sphere. My aim here is to clarify the significance of the values in comparison to 
technical and academic knowledge in shaping an institutionalized military professional. 
Chapter IV describes moral formation based on general concepts drawn by 
Kohlberg that will support some considerations related to military education. I use some 
material from education professionals, all with military experience, to outline how the 
Brazilian Armed Forces deal with the consequences of the previous conclusions about 
professionalism and values.  
13 
Chapter V analyzes how the historical facts can evidence military education and 
training throughout history. To trace this process, I describe how the Brazilian military was 
formed in the colonial era, analyzing its transformation after the independence process and 
creation of the Brazilian monarchy. I address the period of revolutions, which evoked 
political polarization within the Brazilian Armed Forces and the consequent involvement 
of the military in armed uprisings that helped to consolidate the military as a moderating 
power in the nation. Furthermore, I analyze two theses that take anthropological and 
sociological approaches,50 which help me to evidence those elements in the modern 
military system of socialization. First, I consider those elements within the Brazilian Army, 
and then, within our focal branch: the Brazilian Air Force. 
Chapter VI examines how the Brazilian Air Force educates and trains its future 
junior officers. Moreover, it compares the previous theory and history with the curricular 
evolution of the training courses of FAB officers, in terms of the typical military 
professional fields. The purpose of this comparison is to identify how much the concept of 
professionalism harmonizes with educational practice, and how that educational approach 
prepares new officers to fulfill the FAB mission. 
Finally, Chapter VII summarizes, condenses, and analyzes the data and information 
collected to allow a logical chain of reasoning, presenting the findings for the confirmation 
of the hypothesis. In conclusion, since the academic curricula of the training for FAB 
officers must be modified in the military area of knowledge, I determine how best to 
improve it to fully meet the operational demands of the missions the Brazilian Air Force 
must perform. 
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The question that guides the research documented in this thesis—“How can the 
Brazilian Air Force best adapt its existing military ethics-related curricula to help 
junior officers increase professionalism?”—emphasizes three words: ethics, curricula, 
and professionalism. In this context, this chapter seeks to provide an overview of the 
main theoretical concepts related to military professionalism. 
A. OVERVIEW OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM
Samuel Huntington was one of the first authors to deepen the study of the barracks,
developing an analysis that sought to investigate and delineate the characteristics of the 
military as a profession. His work, The Soldier and the State, introduced the modern 
concept of the civil-military relationship. In practice, this concept maintains that the 
military is and always will be a political agent within the structure of the State.51 According 
to Huntington, “Military Institutions which reflect only social values may be incapable of 
performing effectively their military function. On the other hand, it may be impossible to 
contain within society military institutions shaped purely by functional imperatives.”52 
From this assertion, we can deduce that an armed force that does not reflect prevailing 
social values will not be able to fulfill its assignments. In the same way, an armed force 
that reflects only the threats to which it was destined to fight53 (reflected mainly in its 
capacities techniques) will not be able to fulfill its mission either. 
It is in this context that Huntington expresses what he considers to be the most 
compelling thesis in his work: Huntington says that “a profession is a peculiar kind of 
functional group with highly specialized characteristics.”54 Nonetheless, this definition is 
not sufficient to distinguish military professionals. To distinguish military professionals 
from medical or legal professionals, Huntington deepens his analysis and allows us a 
51 Huntington, 3. 
52 Huntington, 2. 
53 Huntington, 2. 
54 Huntington, 7. 
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conceptualization of professionalism that is the basis for the present review of the 
professional profile of the Brazilian Air Force Temporary Officer. 
Huntington states that three distinct characteristics connect professionalism to a 
special kind of vocation: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.55 For this analysis to 
be as precise as possible, it is necessary to conceptualize each one of these characteristics 
so that it is possible to identify them, first in the Brazilian Armed Forces, and later, in the 
Brazilian Air Force, specifically in the Corps of Temporary Officers. 
The first characteristic, expertise, is related to specialized knowledge and skill in a 
significant field of human endeavor. Professional experience is gained only through 
continued education and experience; that is, professional knowledge is recognized by its 
intellectual expression combined with practical experience. The academic and practical 
sides of a profession are maintained and enhanced through journals, conferences, and the 
movement of personnel between practice and teaching.56 In the case of the armed forces, 
the expertise that distinguishes this professional from any other in society, making it a 
unique professional element, is the ability to manage violence.57  
The second characteristic highlighted by Huntington is responsibility, which is 
exemplified by the specialist who works in a social context and performs an essential 
service for the functioning of society.58 The prime client of a professional would then be 
society. This social responsibility distinguishes the professional from other specialists who 
have only intellectual abilities but no sense of duty. According to this concept, the 
professional would cease to be professional if he used his skills in a way detrimental to 
society. Financial remuneration, in this case, cannot be the primary objective of the 
professional, but rather the service which is based on a higher ideal than the professional 
himself and his ambitions.59 Consequently, services provided by a professional require 
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specific laws and codes to regulate their work and to clarify conflicts between the 
professional and society, the client.60 The profession then incorporates specific ethics, 
linked to certain values and ideals that guide its members in their relations with the society 
they serve.61  
Finally, Huntington’s last characteristic for defining professionalism is 
corporateness, which is related to the sense of organic unity, stemming from the discipline 
and training required for professional competence and the sharing with one another a 
unique social responsibility.62 The ownership of specialization and the acceptance of 
special responsibility distinguish the professional from others. The specific interest of 
society in the skills of the professional limits the use of this professionalism only to the 
areas where this competence has relevance, while preventing professionals from other 
fields from claiming competence in that specific field.63 This sense of duty and associated 
collectivity create an exclusivist ambience, which leads military institutions to be built as 
autonomous communities apart from society, even though they exist to serve it.64 Because 
of this, the separation between personal and professional life in the military career is very 
tenuous since the institution, its values, and its duties absorb all aspects of the life of its 
members. Huntington argues that this separation between the military and the civilian 
society is represented by the use of uniform and insignia, which carry the symbolism of 
belonging to a closed system of specialists whose doorway incorporates daily rituals and 
rites of passage that begin at the base of the hierarchical chain, common to all who join 
it.65 Ultimately, the primary goal of initial military education to which all are subjected is 
not to train the technician but to incorporate moral and institutional values (responsibility 
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and corporateness), eliminating those who have no vocation among the candidates for 
military officers.66 
In short, a member of the military can only be considered a professional if he or she 
possesses specific techniques to manage violence, techniques that are maximized by shared 
institutional experience. This service member must embody a sense of duty toward society, 
valuing it more than personal financial gain, similar to the attitude of a priest to the 
priesthood. Finally, military personnel must have a sense of belonging and clarity regarding 
the singularity of the institution to which they belong. In practice, while the expertise is 
related to the training of the military member as a technician, the other two 
characteristics—responsibility and corporateness—form the basis of military ethics, for 
they give rise to values such as duty, honor, and esprit de corps, for example. 
Huntington does not go deeper into issues of values venerated in military 
institutions to contrast them with the values of Western society. After all, this is not the 
purpose of The Soldier and the State. Nonetheless, it is possible to extract from his work 
at least one important statement, which can be confirmed in the chapter dealing with ethics 
and military values. According to Huntington, the officer corps has always had a higher 
affinity for conservatism. In fact, he argues that as society moved in the direction of 
liberalism, the armed forces, in an attempt to maintain their Code of Ethics, moved in the 
opposite direction, toward conservatism.67 
After the American Civil War, military academies struggled to incorporate liberal 
technical education into their curricula while maintaining basic military training focused 
on absorbing institutional values and “violence management” techniques.68 Trying to 
incorporate the fullness of what liberal technical training would have to offer, and at the 
same time, maintaining the military curriculum necessary for the incorporation of 
institutional values proved to be impractical, resulting in an inefficient outcome in both 
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respects.69 The armed forces are then thought to incorporate into their ranks liberal 
technicians already trained by civilian universities, leaving to the academies the mission of 
adapting them to the value system and organizational culture. At that time, this proved to 
be problematic, as faculties would inculcate the values of a disgruntled society with 
military institutions, diminishing the quantity and quality of future officers yet to be 
trained.70 On the other hand, training the liberal technician in military academies and 
leaving military training to a later stage also proved to be complicated. In the words of 
Huntington himself: “The armed services, however, were neither equipped nor inclined to 
compete with colleges and universities in the liberal arts area. It would indeed have been 
hard to justify the national government’s moving into liberal arts education even if all the 
graduates of the federal colleges entered government service.”71 The direct consequence 
of this dilemma is to consider that academic technical education cannot supplant specific 
military education, which risks unbalancing the Expertise-Responsibility-Corporateness 
triad, leading to the loss of qualifications that make it possible to consider a group of 
military personnel as “war professionals.” 
Thus, we could summarize the main ideas of Huntington that are useful to this 
analysis as follows: 
1. Military professionalism encompasses three characteristics that, if not 
fully met, do not allow the institution to be considered professional. They 
are expertise (which brings together technique and experience), 
responsibility (which brings together the sense of duty, devotion, and 
sacrifice), and corporateness (which nourishes the sense of belonging to 
something greater and sustains the organizational culture).  
2. There is a clash between the values of liberal society, which pressures the 
military institution for the adoption of academic technicality, something 
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that would deconstruct the integrity of professionalism previously 
mentioned. 
Yet, in spite of the unique qualifications and quality of the military and the 
structuring of its institutions apart from society, in order to serve it better, it would be 
incoherent to deduce that the armed forces can exist outside social change and influence of 
society. This aspect of the professional realities of the military is little explored by 
Huntington but is the subject of a more focused analysis by Charles Moskos and Frank 
Wood in The Military: More Than Just a Job? In fact, the work makes clear in its first 
paragraph that the military has to be analyzed as a social organization, which grows and 
evolves as such. Despite the military maintaining its autonomy before society, it is 
modified by it.72 
One of the significant contributions of Moskos and Wood’s thesis that 
complements Huntington’s defined characteristics of the military professional is the 
presentation of a dynamic and interactive relation between that professional and the society 
he serves. While Huntington focuses on a static professional profile that appears unchanged 
over time and in diverse cultures, Moskos and Wood make it clear that this would be a 
dynamic and symbiotic system. To clarify how this interaction happens, Moskos and Wood 
introduce two concepts that are very important in understanding what is essential for the 
integrity of military institutions: the ideas of occupational social organization and 
institutional social organization. 
The distinction between the two profiles is very clear, and summarized and 
contrasted by Moskos, using the 12 specific areas shown in Table 1:  
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Table 1. Military Social Organization: Institutional versus Occupational73 
Variable Institutional Occupational 
Legitimacy  Normative values Marketplace economy 
Societal Regard Esteem based on notions of service 
Prestige based on level of 
compensation 
Role Commitments Diffuse; generalist Specific; specialist 
Reference Groups Vertical within the armed forces 
“Horizontal” with 
occupations outside the 
military 
Recruitment Appeals Character qualities; life-style orientation 
High recruit pay; technical 
training 
Evaluation of 
Performance Holistic and qualitative Segment and quantitative 
Basis of Compensation Rank and seniority; decompressed by rank 
Skill level and manpower 
shortages; compressed by 
rank 
Mode of Compensation Much in noncash form of deferred Salary and bonuses 
Legal System Military justice; broad purview over member 
Civilian jurisprudence; 
limited purview over 
member 
Female Roles Limited employment; restricted career pattern 
Wide employment; open 
career pattern 
Spouse Integral part of military Removed from military community 
Residence 
Work and residence 
adjacency; military 
housing; relocations 
Work and residence 
separation; civilian housing 
permanence 
Post-Service Status Veterans’ benefits and preferences Same as nonserver 
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A closer look at the characteristics raised by Moskos, as seen in Table 1, reveals 
that some of the aspects pointed out by Huntington about the professional military appear 
in the descriptions of an institutional organization. It is a clear case of the variables of 
legitimacy, social regard, recruitment appeals, mode of compensation, spouse, and 
residence. As for societal regard, for example, Huntington highlighted the vocation of a 
class that donates its professional capabilities to society, without which society would 
perish. Because of this particular condition of dependence on these special services, 
specific laws and codes are established within the institution, while others are imposed to 
protect the relationship of the armed forces with society. This appears in the legitimacy 
variable in the Table 1. Additionally, the variable mode of compensation confirms what 
Huntington has stated, that in professional organizations, wages alone are unable to offer 
the rewards that the exercise of a selfless profession requires. As Huntington says, vocation 
ends up being important in a setting like this. 
Clearly, this analysis of the characteristics of an institutional organization by 
Moskos and Wood further develops Huntington’s observations. Moreover, the book The 
Military: More than Just a Job? identifies another more recent profile of the armed forces, 
one that is moving from the institutional to the occupational spectrum.74 
Moskos and Wood point out that in the last decades, military professionals have 
been under intense social pressure. On one hand, the internal institutional pressure tries to 
mold them to the current organizational culture and instill in them the military values 
system. On the other hand, there is the external pressure of the liberal society, which 
demands from this group, naturally isolated from society, an adjustment to the occupational 
groups with which there is some technical identification.75 The military pilot is required by 
the air force to be “military,” and at the same time is under social pressure to be a pilot. As 
these pressures affect all levels of the organization, they are reflected even in the military 
curriculum, which presents, in the construction of the professional profile, this tension 
between the liberal technician and the military specialist already delineated by Huntington. 
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In Huntington’s view, the institutional organization outlined by Moskos and Wood 
would be the only organization that could be considered a real professional organization 
since it is the only one that leads to the necessary expertise, responsibility, and 
corporateness.76 Migration from the institutional to the occupational profile would be, 
interpreting Huntington, the migration from professional to non-professional. Huntington 
asserts that the professional qualifications of the military are a direct result of the vital 
mission to be performed for the benefit of society. It would be intuitive to conclude, then, 
that if Huntington is right, the occupational organizations do not meet the demands of 
society and therefore do not fulfill their mission. But do Moskos and Wood in any way 
confirm this? They do, albeit partially: “Does a tilt toward civilization make any real 
difference in military effectiveness? We think that it does. The results of creeping 
occupationalism can be found in three key areas: mission performance, member 
motivation, and professional responsibility.”77 
Regarding mission performance, Moskos and Wood argue that the military requires 
a behavior of its members that cannot be motivated by personal interests and demands a 
certain degree of self-denial.78 The internalization of essential values is the differential that 
only an institutional organization can provide. It is these values that come from the intrinsic 
motivation that leads its members to fulfill the mission since the strength of an extrinsic 
motivation would be insufficient.79 In fact, the dynamics of the use of extrinsic motivation 
in the long term can undermine the motivation of military professionals, given the 
impossibility of keeping military professionals relevant in all possible scenarios in which 
they can be deployed in missions performed by the armed forces.80 Finally, when dealing 
with professional responsibility, Moskos and Wood are even more incisive in stating how 
an occupational organization is inadequate for the military compared to an institutional 
organization. 
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If military functions can be reduced to dollars, then ultimate decisions on 
the military organization and military personnel become the province of 
cost-benefit analysts; decisions are removed from the military profession. 
An institutional approach, on the contrary, never loses sight of uniqueness 
of military organization in a democratic society. The nation has entrusted 
its armed forces with responsibilities rarely, if never, found in civilian 
life…the real possibility that military members will risk life….81 
Thus, it is clear that despite deepening the analysis of military proficiency, Moskos 
and Wood endorse the concepts presented by Huntington, who even though not using the 
definition of institutional organization, ends up agreeing with it as the profile that is 
necessary to consider the military as professionals capable of fulfilling their social duties. 
While acknowledging the importance of institutional organization for maintaining 
the integrity of the armed forces in fulfilling their mission, however, Moskos and Wood’s 
thesis makes it clear that it is impossible to avoid this “contamination” of the institutional 
profile by the occupational profile coming from civilian society, which ultimately leads to 
individual changes. The authors cite the work of Canadian Charles A. Cotton, who says it 
is impractical, and even undesirable, to isolate the military from society. In fact, isolating 
an institution already modified by the occupational profile would create what Cotton calls 
“the worst of two worlds: a military isolated from civilian society and a lack of cohesion 
within the military.”82 Indeed, Cotton argues that the ideal situation would be a cohesive 
armed forces (i.e., with its strong institutional profile) congruent with civil society (i.e., 
that absorbs the best that the occupational profile has to offer). 
Just as Huntington’s work on professionalism was drawn from some critical 
considerations about military education, it is necessary to follow this same approach with 
Moskos and Wood, who argue that the first function of military academies is to instill 
institutional values.83 Yet, they also say that conflicts between the institutional social 
organization and the occupational social organization (I/O) are present at this stage.84 This 
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type of contrast is not different from that presented by Huntington, when the tension within 
the curriculum of the military academies between the technical-academic and the 
combative-technical profiles became evident. In other words, the contrast between 
focusing on training the military as warriors and educating the military as academics is also 
perceived by Moskos and Wood as a reality:  
On the one hand, the institutional side of academy life is fostered by 
emphases on character, athletics, and spiritual concerns; on the other, 
occupational tendencies can be found in academic curricula, which 
converge increasingly with civilian institutions of higher education and 
marketing strategies that portray the academy along those lines.85 
Nonetheless, since full reversal of this tendency would be contraindicated or even 
impossible, Moskos and Wood argue that the armed forces can absorb a certain amount of 
occupationalism with intelligent policies that restrain the uncontrolled loss of institutional 
character, especially by developing specific policies for this purpose in the area of 
recruitment and retention, family, gender roles, organizational commitment, and 
leadership.86 
Thus, summarizing what stands out in this work of Moskos and Wood as useful for 
the analysis proposed in this thesis, two points can be considered: 
1. Corporations, including the military, can be framed in two distinct profiles 
of the social organization: institutional and occupational. Of these, the 
institutional profile resembles the professional profile described by 
Huntington as essential for the accomplishment of the military’s mission, 
something that Moskos and Wood also affirm. 
2. Despite the need to preserve an institutional profile, it is impossible to 
avoid the influence of social changes within military organizations. The 
solution would be to maintain the institutional profile in what is essential 
and to give up this profile in favor of a positive influence of the 
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occupational profile on issues of minor relevance that do not jeopardize 
organizational culture and operational readiness. 
Although the I/O duality does not appear explicitly in the works of Morris Janowitz, 
his book The Professional Soldier: The Social and Political Portrait contains some 
assertions that contribute to this thesis. Janowitz states that the history of modern armed 
forces can be summed up in the struggle for hegemony between the heroic leader who 
perpetuates the warrior model and incorporates martial spirit, values, and traditionalism, 
and the “military manager” who deals with the rational and scientific conduct of war. This 
manager, according to Janowitz, “reflects the scientific and pragmatic dimensions of war-
making; he is the professional with effective links to civilian society.”87 Nevertheless, with 
the advent of technological advancement, the figure of the technical specialist, named by 
Janowitz as a military technologist, emerged as a necessity for the organizational revolution 
experienced by the military.88 In this context, despite the role played by all three military 
profiles, the institutional battle between the technologist and the heroic leader presents 
itself as a reality; it is surpassed only by the role played by the military manager, who 
foments the values represented by the “way of the warrior,” all the while breaking down 
some traditions that could represent resistance to the technological advances needed to 
maintain the operational capability of the military.89 
This conflicting reality that pits the warrior against the technician is the same 
struggle perceived by Huntington between the academic-technical that grows within 
military expertise and the valued and ethical concepts derived from responsibility and 
corporateness. And yet, it is the same conflict presented by Moskos and Wood as they 
confront the institutional, value-oriented, and occupational profile, geared to the technical-
functional organization with measurable and, most importantly, negotiable causes and 
consequences. In fact, a more weighted analysis of these three different perceptions, 
presented by various authors, can be embedded on an analytical scale that runs from 
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Huntington’s universal analysis, undergoes an organizational analysis with Moskos and 
Wood, and ends with observation at the individual level (but with organizational 
consequences) by Janowitz. 
Because of the new military reality imposed by technology, Janowitz sees an 
approximation in the structuring and modus operandi of military and nonmilitary 
organizations,90 just as Moskos and Wood trace the migration from the institutional profile 
to the occupational. Yet, he also recognizes the uniqueness of the military profession, 
stemming from his specialization in the art of warfare and the organized use of violence. 
For him, the military community’s style of living and military honor serves to perpetuate 
the organization’s sense of distinction,91 a concept very similar to that developed by 
Huntington in the case of corporateness as an essential characteristic of the military 
professional. According to Janowitz, the officer’s demands go beyond his duties as a 
member of the military and are perpetuated in all spheres of his personal life.92 The closed 
community in which the military lives is therefore crucial for the promotion of cohesion 
and spirit of loyalty, professionalism, and warlike mindset demanded of those who live in 
a constant state of readiness against a possible threat to the nation and, in a more tactical 
universe, to their own lives.93 The integration between personal and professional life is 
evidenced in the emblematic military residences within military organizations94 and by the 
absorption of the personal family nucleus by the large and institutional “military family.”95 
Janowitz argues that in the face of the constant clash between modernization and 
traditionalism, military forces must be controlled by military managers, but their highest 
leadership must include the symbolism represented by heroic leaders in order to keep alive 
the fighting spirit that underpins the organizations.96 Thus, military managers must ensure 
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that the military profession maintains its organizational culture and must help heroic 
leaders inculcate warrior spirit in future generations of officers.97 To cultivate this spirit 
involves no other source than honor. Honor would be the means and the end of all military 
organizations, the mainstay of everything that sets it apart from a civilian organization. By 
honor, “the professional soldier always fights.”98 
Finally, what may be considered Janowitz’s second and major differential from 
Huntington, Moskos, and Wood, is his prognosis of how the military can adapt to a future 
that will develop over a balance between organizational stability and adaptation to rapid 
technological development and political change.99 Janowitz sets out three universal 
positions to be adopted by members of the armed forces, especially officers. First is the 
search for a balance between conventional and modern weapons in a hybrid scenario that 
combines nuclear capability with limited warfare, irregular warfare, and revolutionary 
uprisings. The second entails advising the authorities on the aforementioned threats and the 
use of force for deterrence and persuasion. The third is participation in political and 
administrative plans for inspection and control of military capabilities in regions of 
instability.100 For the adequacy of the armed forces to the tasks just described, Janowitz 
indicates that it is necessary to redefine the professional requirements of the military. These 
requirements should be based on a change of concept regarding the use of the armed forces, 
which would migrate from military force to constabulary forces.101 In Janowitz’s own 
words, “The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continually 
prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international 
relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture.”102 
The armed forces of the future must be prepared to act from the strategic level, with long-
range bombardments and weapons of mass destruction, to the tactical level with para-
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military operations, guerrillas and counter-guerrillas, scaling up the use of force and the 
political and social consequences at each level of performance.103 In this kind of scenario 
there is no clear distinction between peacetime and wartime, and little clarity on who the 
enemy is—whether a regular or irregular force—and how he will act.104 Some analysts say 
the future conflict will be multi-modal. Instead of different opponents “with fundamentally 
different approaches (conventional, irregular or terrorist), [competitors] will employ all 
forms of war—including criminal behavior—simultaneously.”105 This concept of combat 
is called hybrid warfare. Janowitz summarizes the final objective of his work, and at the 
same time provides a guide for the analysis of the professional competences in the FAB: 
“The constabulary concept provides a continuity with past military experiences and 
traditions, but it also offers a basis for the radical adaptation of the profession.”106 
To summarize Janowitz’s main ideas that are important to this paper, three points 
can be highlighted: 
1. Military organizations are characterized by constant conflict between the 
military warrior and the military technician, both of which are necessary 
for the healthy development of the organization. For both to coexist 
efficiently and effectively, the military manager acts as one capable of 
conducting the institution and balancing the warrior way and the 
technician way. 
2. In spite of the role played by the manager and the importance of the 
technician, the highest military leadership should be performed by the 
warrior because of his crucial role in representing institutional values and 
in perpetuating organizational culture for future generations. 
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3. The migration of the military forces to a constabulary forces profile, 
capable of facing not only the external threats but also engaging in the 
demands of a hybrid war, marks the future to which the military must 
conform. 
To finish this first part of the analysis, The Future of the Army Profession, by Don 
Snider, Gayle Watkins, and Lloyd Matthews outlines the characteristics that define an 
activity as a profession, to establish the qualifications that must be developed by military 
personnel so that they can be considered military professionals in the face of the changes 
that society is undergoing and of those that will still come.107 Snider and Watkins begin by 
stating that specific skills and knowledge are the basis for a professional’s qualifications.108 
At this point, there is a direct agreement with the statements of Huntington109 and indirectly 
with those of Janowitz,110 since these authors express clearly that expertise is one of the 
main differentials, along with ethics, that distinguish the professionals of other careers. 
Further, Snider and Watkins add that the ability to adapt the use of these skills in a wide 
range of situations characterizes professionalism.111 Because of these unique 
qualifications, professionals enjoy professional authority stemming from social validation 
for the essential services provided to society.112 Professionals would then have the 
autonomy to impose their professional ethics on society, thanks to the trust conveyed from 
this social validation.113 This specific set of professional ethics is also recognized by 
Huntington, who says that it stems from the fact that differentiated services provided in an 
activity considered to be professional would be vital for the survival of society.114 
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Given the constant evolution of society, the professional, who depends on the 
validation of this same society, is always in a continuous search for a clear definition for 
his or her area of activity, which the authors refer to as professional jurisdiction.115 At this 
point, there is agreement with Janowitz, when it is said that social change points to a need 
for change in the professional profile of the armed forces.116 The constabulary concepts 
developed by Janowitz can be recognized in the ideas of Snider and Watkins who state that 
within the military profession in particular this pursuit of a new professional jurisdiction 
has been unfolding in four different areas of practice: conventional war, unconventional 
war, Military Operations other than War (MOOW), and homeland security.117 The book 
further states that, according to James Burk, a constabulary force generates a more 
politicized armed forces, capable of reasoning with strategic threats and fighting limited 
wars since its political interweaving with other spheres of power increases significantly in 
this.118 For Burk, the evolution of threat scenarios and opportunities for action requires the 
military to redefine its legality in the pursuit of social legitimacy, considering that part of 
the expertise in this range of new missions is shared with other sectors of society.119 
Finally, Snider and Watkins make their differential contribution to this thesis when 
they attest that professionalism and bureaucracy become interdependent.120 In the case of 
the armed forces, however, the high degree of military professionalism goes hand in hand 
with high effectiveness—”the effective and ethical use of expertise,”121 alternating this 
status with a high degree of bureaucracy that goes hand in hand with a high efficiency—
”doing more with less.”122 In other words, the higher the level of professionalism, the 
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greater its effectiveness. This greater professionalism implies a smaller bureaucracy and, 
consequently, a lower efficiency. For the authors, the low budget to finance operational 
actions induces to the excess of bureaucracy123 that ends up harming the 
professionalism.124 This is precisely the situation in which FAB currently fits: low budget 
and search for new jurisdiction in pursuit of social legitimacy. If the consequence of this 
profile is to increase bureaucracy and reduce efficiency to the detriment of effectiveness, 
the military educational system should focus on strengthening institutional values, as 
attested by John Mattox,125 while also investing in technical development aimed at 
supplanting loss of efficacy. 
In sum, “a profession is a relatively high status [legitimacy] occupation whose 
members apply abstract knowledge [expertise] to solve problems in a particular field of 
endeavor [jurisdiction].”126 It is important to highlight that, according to some sociologists, 
status and legitimacy depend on social needs.127 Thus, according to Burk, professional 
practice is strong when the application of expertise within a particular jurisdiction is 
uncontested and recognized as legitimate.128 
To summarize the main ideas from The Futures of the Army Profession that are 
useful to this thesis, four points can be highlighted: 
1. Military professionalism is the use of expertise in fulfilling a specific 
mission in a different jurisdiction that will find support in social 
legitimacy. 
2. The quest for legitimacy requires expanding jurisdiction. To expand 
jurisdiction, expertise needs to be modified. 
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3. The modification of expertise currently points to the hybrid profile: 
conventional war, unconventional war, MOOW, and homeland security. 
4. Changes to a hybrid profile increase efficiency and reduce bureaucracy. 
B. CONCLUSION 
The armed forces can be considered professionals when its members possess 
expertise, responsibility, and corporateness to fulfill a specific mission in a well-defined 
jurisdiction, thus finding social legitimacy. Given this, all efforts made in the FAB should 
be focused on developing these three characteristics in their future officers, perfecting its 
jurisdiction, and improving its mission and effectiveness. 
In spite of the growing influence of liberal values within military institutions, 
provoking a break with institutional social organization toward the occupational social 
organization and giving up traditional organizational culture will only help to weaken the 
characteristics that define the military professional. This in turn harms the FAB in 
preparation for the accomplishment of its missions. Nevertheless, considering that the 
occupational organizational profile is the result of a dizzying technological evolution in 
society, which is necessary for the FAB to remain relevant in future employment scenarios, 
it is imperative to take preventive measures. Consequently, the FAB should rely on officers 
with a managerial profile who will balance the organizational culture that values the heroes 
of the past and the military man as a combatant while investing in the development of more 
technical curricula in the preparation of members who will develop new technologies. All 
this effort should be harmonized with an air force that should be designed to engage in 
wars with the hybrid profile, capable of acting both in conventional and irregular warfare 
missions, assuming a constabulary force profile. 
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III. THE MILITARY ETHICS 
Ethics is crucial for military professionalism. In a postmodern society where 
relativism reigns,129 it is not only still possible but essential to establish values considered 
universal and impervious to cultural or temporal influences. These values are considered 
the core of military morality and distinguish the institution from civilian organizations that 
are usually transformed according to culture. This chapter provides an overview of how it 
is possible to understand and accept the concept of universal ethics that goes beyond culture 
and society, which is essential to combat moral and ethical relativism within the military. 
The section demonstrates how military ethics makes use of this premise to determine that 
the construction of the military ethos has as its primary objective the development of 
professionals who will be the guardians of this universal ethic, which will be faithful to 
virtue and not to the rules. By the end of this chapter, it will be clear that business values 
and neoliberalism can adversely affect a virtuous armed force, the military organizational 
culture, and consequently the military’s ability to fulfill its constitutional tasks. 
A. OVERVIEW OF ETHICS AND THE MILITARY PROFESSION 
It is commonly accepted in a modern society that ethics is not universal, but rather 
tied to the culture of a community.130 Thus, the first task performed in this chapter is to 
demonstrate that, even outside the military sphere or the professional aspect, a universal 
set of ethics exists, which goes beyond cultural and temporal elements, and allows us to 
establish absolute values in place of relative values. 
The first approach to this task is made through the book The Abolition of Man, by 
C.S. Lewis. In this work, Lewis rejects the generic designation of “postmodernism” in 
society, a position that considers objective truth non-existent or relative (i.e., nothing is 
true in itself); postmodernism accepts that there are as many truths as the subjects that 
interact with an object or concept, and all of these “truths” are equally valid.131 To use an 
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illustration from Lewis’s book,132 when a person says that “a waterfall is sublime,” 
according to relativism, he/she would be just saying how he/she feels in the presence of the 
waterfall. As a consequence, those who follow the postmodernist thinking discard these 
feelings as unimportant or merely subjective without any rational foundation. If the 
waterfall is sublime for one person or awful for another one, both statements are equally 
true. 
For the armed forces to be considered guardians of virtue, as explained in the works 
of James H. Toner and Richard Gabriel, and to defend the supremacy of certain values over 
others, the military must have strong philosophical evidence to help them argue against 
postmodern relativism. Lewis refers to the existence of some moral precepts common to 
various religions, cultures, and civilizations; such a universal value system subsists through 
tradition and objective values, which, for convenience, Lewis calls the Tao.133 Despite the 
differences between cultural and religious traditions, C. S. Lewis argues that “what is 
common to them all is something we cannot neglect. It is the doctrine of objective value, 
the belief that certain attitudes are really true, and others really false, to the kind of thing 
the universe is and the kind of things we are.”134 
On the other hand, according to Lewis, the person who is a critic of objective values 
is subject to a logical fallacy. The whole purpose of such arguments would be to share 
certain opinions that would be, to some extent, valiant and correct while appealing to 
individual perception to demystify the belief in universal values. That is, “there are no 
universal values and truths! And this is a universal truth!” In the words of C.S. Lewis 
himself: 
This thing which I have called for convenience the Tao, and which others 
may call Natural Law or Traditional Morality or the First Principles of 
Practical Reason or the First Platitudes, is not one among a series of possible 
systems of value. It is the sole source of all value judgements…The effort 
to refute it and raise a new system of value in its place is self-contradictory. 
There has never been, and never will be, a radically new judgement of value 
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in the history of the world. What purport to be new systems or (as they now 
call them) ‘ideologies’, all consist of fragments from the Tao itself.135 
Then, if universal values are real, and the armed forces can fight for them, Lewis 
attests that those values and education walk side-by-side. Lewis’s work emphasizes the 
importance of education, voluntary or involuntary (i.e., planned or unplanned), in the 
process of constructing the Tao.136 According to Lewis, the mere fact of knowing and 
recognizing universal values does not guarantee adherence to them. Without the trained 
emotions the intellect remains impotent before the natural instinct. Lewis goes on to state, 
for example, that he 
had sooner play cards against a man who was quite skeptical about ethics, 
but bred to believe that ‘a gentleman does not cheat,’ than against an 
irreproachable moral philosopher who had been brought up among sharpers. 
In battle it is not syllogisms that will keep the reluctant nerves and muscles 
to their post in the third hour of the bombardment.137  
Indeed, in the case of the armed forces, which require the self-sacrifice of their lives 
in defense of the nation, if it is necessary, Lewis states that it would be unlikely that 
ordinary people would feel an urge to do anything by species or posterity merely by instinct 
or rationality. Only those who received a specific type of education could bear in mind the 
idea of “posterity” and sacrifice for this anonymous collectivity.138 In sum, Lewis states 
there are universal values common to the cultural and religious heritage of various 
civilizations that can be considered the basis of the moral sense of humanity. These values, 
in spite of being universal, are not intrinsic and are transmitted through education. 
The next step is to investigate ethics and morals in the military world, and how 
military values present themselves to society. The first analysis comes from James H. 
Toner, True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military Ethics. Toner analyzes military 
moral precepts in contrast to the morality of society and establishes the premise that 
barracks values must take precedence over common social values when both contradict 
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each other in the process of building organizational culture. A “bad man” may even be a 
good professional in many areas, but he can never be a good military man.139 
Toner begins his book by declaring that the study of ethics raises the noblest and 
essential questions that can be asked: what kind of attitudes and beliefs ennoble us? What 
does it really mean to be human?140 This questioning that Toner uses as the cornerstone of 
his approach clarifies his alignment with the premise established by Lewis. For Toner, 
there are values that must be preserved and cultivated so that a person can be considered a 
human being. For Toner, as for Lewis, ethics differentiates men from animals.141 Toner 
makes it clear that in the face of cultural relativism, some values remain perennial within 
the concept of what is ethical, just and good, independent of the social lenses that are used 
to try to justify attitudes that, in return, will always be considered unethical, as in the case 
of anthropophagy, for example.142 
Thus, since there are fundamental, or universal, values that help “humanize” 
society, Toner establishes a direct relationship between military institutions and those 
values. First, he highlights the state of moral decay to which society is subject, where the 
concepts of virtue and duty are lost.143 Toner demonstrates that the moral bankruptcy of 
modern society reflected in the culture144 also appears in the educational system.145 The 
direct consequence of this is that this bankruptcy must also be reflected in the system of 
military education, from which it is inferred that the study and practice of ethics are 
fundamental in the education process of the future members of the armed forces. Indeed, 
Toner affirms that the teaching and development of honor must precede training or 
technical qualifications.146 At this point, there is clear consonance between Toner’s thought 
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and the claims of Huntington,147 Moskos and Wood,148 and Janowitz,149 who emphasize in 
their works the singular importance of the development of the institutional profile 
(affection for morals and values) before the occupational profile (affection for technical 
issues). Toner uses the words of the British scholar-soldier Sir John Hackett to highlight 
the armed forces’ fundamental role as “moral compass” in society.150 
This consonance between the works that analyze the military professionalism and 
the work of Toner also extends to the consideration of the unique character of the military 
profession. The duty to kill and die for a companion, for the constitution and cause of the 
nation, assuming the responsibilities arising from that duty, is the mark that distinguishes 
a soldier from a civilian.151 The military profession is similar to other professions in 
promoting the purposes for which they were created, in this case, to make war. 
Nevertheless, it is different from other professions, since its members undertake to defend 
not the personal or collective interests, but the interest of the nation expressed in the 
constitution.152 Moreover, as pointed out by Huntington,153 Moskos and Wood,154 the 
greatest danger to the military profession is that it “contaminates” itself through contact 
with exclusive centers of power and civilian influence, which may weaken military codes 
and adversely affect the competence of the organization.155 Once again, the institutional 
versus occupational duality appears. Military ethics, in this case, would help maintain the 
integrity of the profession by requiring the military to distinguish right from wrong. 
The entire military training system must then be geared to the training of war 
professionals in carrying out this duty. Regardless of the possibility of combat, the 
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preparation of the military should be focused on its purpose and not on the setting in which 
they are inserted; regardless of the imminent fight, education and training must be intense 
and a priority.156 In fact, the paradox pointed out by the old Roman dictum, Si vis pax, 
pacem bellum (If you want peace, prepare for war) is that the more well prepared the armed 
forces of a nation are, the less likely they are to enter into combat.157 This preparation 
requires not only accurate technical training, but the training of the virtue allied to it, 
combining competence and character.158 In agreement with Huntington,159 Moskos and 
Wood160 on the fundamental role of military values in professional training, Toner, like 
Janowitz,161 associates the institutional (moral) to the occupational (technical) profile, 
stating that military education trains soldiers to associate talent with honor.162 A well-
trained and well-armed troop without clear and cohesive morals could be a source of both 
good and evil.163 
Then, Toner makes clear that the moral preparation of the troops must enable them 
to obey legal orders without hesitation while disobeying flagrantly illegal orders. A 
professional soldier before being loyal to his leaders, his companions, his mission, or his 
duty, should be loyal to virtue itself.164 Ultimately, connecting this concept with the 
concept espoused by C.S. Lewis,165 true soldiers must be loyal to the Tao, and therefore, 
they must be educated for it. Toner openly declares what character can and should be taught 
and learned.166 The path that can be useful in this learning process is to recognize the 
malevolent potential that exists in every human being; to emphasize, in the community, the 
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duties in harmony with the rights; and restoring worship to national heroes.167 In possession 
of these truths, military education institutions, whatever they may be, must be concerned 
with inculcating the moral virtue necessary for building the character of the military 
professional through policies that seek to hire and to promote teachers and instructors who 
incorporate the desired moral attributes into the troop. Also, the establishment of curricula 
with a high moral standard of competence, coupled with an organizational atmosphere that 
moves their staff toward the pursuit of virtuous behavior, is essential to achieve the ethical 
standard of excellence required by the military profession.168 
To sum up, what can be extracted from Toner’s thinking is there are values that can 
be considered ethical, regardless of the culture or society in which they present themselves. 
These values are the basis of professional military ethics, which demands of these 
professionals who are trained to kill and die, an irreproachable value behavior, under the 
penalty of qualifying as propagators of evil or injustice. These professionals must be 
prepared and educated according to a high moral code, which associates obedience to the 
constitution with timeless and borderless virtue. Once this code gives space to a society’s 
values that are not related to the values of duty and sacrifice typical of an armed force, 
there is a risk of degeneration of the military’s ability to fulfill its mission. 
To add more relevant points related to military ethics, an analysis of To Sever with 
Honor: The Treatise on Military Ethics and the Way of the Soldier, by Richard A. Gabriel, 
is needed. The single sentence that can synthesize the author’s main premise appears at the 
beginning of his work: “[T]he effectiveness and success of a military force rests far more 
on the moral quality of its officers and men than it does on technical expertise.”169 The 
author states very forcefully that the military is suffering from a process of ethical 
erosion.170 This process is triggered by a series of external and internal factors that 
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contribute to the replacement of the traditional moral code of the military by a set of values 
that undermine the institution, weakening its character and its organizational culture. 
Among the external factors listed by Gabriel are the changing moral standards in 
society, combined with permissiveness and liberal campaigns for greater individual rights 
and privileges within the military. This statement confirms Toner’s perception171 of the 
moral degeneracy of society, giving strength to the emphatic defense of the need to 
preserve traditional values—Lewis’ Tao172—within the military. In addition, Gabriel also 
speaks of a “civilizing” process of the military, that is, the substitution of typically military 
values for values affecting civilian life. Finally, the third relevant external factor cited by 
Gabriel is the injunction of managerial and business values within the armed forces, which 
has turned many officers into managers rather than leaders.173 It is interesting to note that 
these last two external factors agree with Moskos’ and Wood’s ideas, confirming the 
migration of the military from an institutional profile to an occupational profile.174  The 
counterpoint to Gabriel would be the perspective of Janowitz, who does not view 
management values so perniciously, but even deems them necessary to balance the historic 
clash between the “warrior” and the “technician” profiles that fight for hegemony in the 
conduct of the armed forces.175 
In parallel, Gabriel cites four internal factors that have contributed to the erosion of 
military values. First, Gabriel mentions ethical relativism—the premise that if something 
works and gives results, then it is correct; a Machiavellian176 thought that says the “ends 
justify the means.”177 This relativism was also observed by Lewis,178 not only within the 
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armed forces but in society as a whole. By analogy, Lewis’s considerations about the 
ineffectiveness of ethical relativism179 can also be considered within military institutions, 
which would have in the figure of the Tao values moral an argument that disqualifies 
Machiavellian thought. Second, Gabriel stresses the “loyalty syndrome,” when soldiers’ 
commitment ties are greater with their bosses than with the institution’s moral values.180 
Toner fights this same problem, and highlights that members of the military should be 
taught to be faithful to virtue, resisting orders that pierce military ethics.181 Third, he speaks 
of an excessive zeal with the image of the armed forces that prevents moral stains from 
being exposed in the name of preserving the institution, hindering any institutional 
corrections necessary at the collective level.182 Finally, Gabriel refers to what he calls the 
“drive for success,” which is more common among officials who are more prone to 
corruption of values tied to entrepreneurship, careerism, and managerialism.183 
Gabriel disagrees with the premise that claims the preparation of a good 
professional will lead to the preparation of a good citizen, an ethical subject. He notes the 
confusion between academics who discuss military ethics, between professional ethics and 
moral ethics, and between the ethics of virtues and ethics of duty.184 In other words, good 
practitioners are not necessarily ethical subjects, and virtuous subjects will not necessarily 
fulfill their duties. 
To combat eroded military morale, Gabriel proposes an ideological code of ethics 
that precedes individual ethics. Gabriel states that the proper teaching of this code is 
essential for the promotion of corrections that the military needs. The first point of this 
moral code is to recognize that the military is different from all other social institutions 
since military organization has as its function the social organization of violence, 
demanding the sacrifice of the life of its members—whether by the loss of individuality 
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before the community or for death on the battlefield.185 Gabriel goes further and establishes 
the four main characteristics that distinguish the military profession: the scope of the 
service, which associates it with the guarantee of survival of the state and of society;186 the 
level of responsibility, which places on the “military shoulders” a significant burden related 
to care of the lives of an extended group of people;187 the extension of personal 
responsibility, which demands of the military professional an integral commitment of his 
life—requiring the loss of certain individualities and the development of certain specific 
behavioral profiles—with the task to be fulfilled;188 and, finally, the monopoly of practice 
which, in addition to considering that the exercise of organized violence is carried out only 
by the military, also believes that the skills developed within the armed forces will rarely 
have direct applicability outside the military corporation. These characteristics are in 
accordance with Moskos’ concepts of the primacy of institutional social organization,189 
and are partially corroborated by Toner,190 who invokes these premises to justify the 
necessity of maintaining the high moral standard, dissociated from the social patterns that 
contradict them. This aspect of the uniqueness of the military profession is also echoed in 
the works of Huntington191 and Janowitz,192 who use this premise to justify the need to 
maintain the institutional profile. 
Finally, it is possible to extract from Gabriel three basic directives for the future 
development of military professionalism.193 The author talks about maintaining a distance 
from the methodologies of the civilian world, even though it seems attractive to apply these 
methodologies in the military environment because they have been successful for 
entrepreneurs and corporations. Second, as an extension of the first concept, Gabriel uses 
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the term “owning his own house,” or the need to generate values specific to one’s own 
professional reality. Finally, Gabriel emphasizes the need for the military to develop a clear 
and assertive code of ethics regarding the duties of its members, not giving way to 
subjectivities. An analysis of these recommendations makes clear that while Janowitz 
preaches reconciliation between military and society, represented in the figure of “military 
manager,”194 Gabriel advocates a certain distance to achieve autonomy. By contrast, 
Janowitz’s assertions that the military assumes a profile of a constabulary force195 are not 
so conflicting with the demands made by Gabriel since they seek a more practical solution 
to maintain a strengthened institutional profile in view of the need to adapt to the social 
demands that have been presented to the military. 
To sum up Gabriel’s assertions significant for this thesis, it is possible to say that 
the absorption of entrepreneurial values from the civil world and the incorporation of social 
values that are not in keeping with the unique characteristics of the military profession 
contribute to a moral crisis within the armed forces. This affects the military’s ability to 
fulfill its mission. The detachment of the military from these influences toward the 
establishment of methodological and ideological independence is the way to restore lost 
efficiency in this process. 
Building on this, The Future of the Army Profession, by Don Snider, Gayle 
Watkins, and Lloyd Matthews, contains an essay about ethics by John Mattox, in which 
testifies, like Toner,196 that military professionals must have competence and character. 
They must be moral and technically skillful leaders.197 Morality is so important that Snider, 
Watkins, and Matthews point out, in the chapter introduction, an enlightening program for 
character renewal at all levels of the armed forces is an essential resource for professional 
transformation that maintains the effectiveness of the military.198 Mattox makes it very 
clear, however, that while the armed forces must transform and adapt to remain socially 
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relevant, and therefore professional, the moral standard must remain unchanged throughout 
the process.199 He affirms that “by the nature of the profession of arms, only officers of 
firm moral character can discharge properly their professional obligations to the nation and 
to their subordinates that they are called to lead.”200 These affirmations not only confirm 
the claims of Huntington,201 and Moskos and Wood,202 on the importance of moral values 
for military professionalism, but they reinforce the assertions of Toner203 and Gabriel204 
regarding the primacy of moral ethics on technical training and the values of civil society. 
For Mattox, as for Huntington,205 the differentiated nature of the military profession 
generates the need for professionals with a moral commitment differentiated from other 
professions in society.206 
For Mattox, morality cannot exist without the state, which is the greater good of 
society, protecting man from the state of nature defined by Hobbes, where “man is wolf to 
man.”207 The state cannot exist without the military. So, ultimately, the military is the 
guardian of morality, and has a moral obligation to fight for the preservation of the state.208 
Hobbes’ social contract implies that personal sovereignty given in favor of the state serves 
for the state to provide security to all members of the social contract under the penalty that 
those who guarantee security must relinquish their own sovereignty. That is, being military 
requires sacrifice.209 
Mattox concludes his reasoning on the necessity of morality in the military 
affirming that before tasks that require correct moral reasoning, moral subjects are the most 
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capable to complete these tasks.210 Mattox echoes Toner211 and Gabriel212 when affirming 
that a military member must be of a high moral standard to carry out the responsibilities 
that his or her mission demands. In the most critical situations that deal with human lives 
and survival of the state, there are no external guarantees that a military member without 
high moral standards will fulfill his or her mission. Only morality can guarantee this.213 
Finally, Section V of the book The Future of the Army Profession also conveys 
some new ideas on Toner in an article titled “Message to Garcia: Leading Soldiers in Moral 
Mayhem,” where the author expresses concerns about relativism and states that the 
subjective or relativistic pattern of nihilism ends up being in itself an objective pattern and, 
therefore, contradictory.214 This statement confirms Lewis’ argument on the subject215 and 
disqualifies any subjective moral reasoning. This is not the only point of congruence 
between Lewis and Toner. In another passage, Toner says that the military ethos is morally 
defensible “to the extent that it is rooted in transcendent truth.”216 This idea of transcendent 
truth closely resembles the concept of Tao presented by Lewis;217 that is, military values 
are an expression of the Tao, being, therefore, objective and non-subjective values. 
Toner, in his essay, reconfirms the concept he had set forth and his book, already 
analyzed in this chapter,218 that the good man as a leader knows when to follow orders and 
when not to.219 And not only this, it reinforces the concept that postmodern society corrupts 
characters in the most diverse social spheres, such as homes, schools, and churches,220 as 
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he attested in True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military Ethics, and as Gabriel221 
and Moskos and Wood222 also attested. 
According to Toner, three considerations can help a military professional to solve 
ethical problems: customs, rules, and results.223 Before the difficult decisions on what 
attitude to take, the military professional should analyze local customs. If local traditions 
corroborate a specific practice, the second step would be to examine the rules to which the 
armed forces and the country of origin of the military professional are subjected. Even so, 
if the analyzed practice goes through these first two filters, the result of the action must be 
taken into consideration. 
Toner ends by pointing out four virtues, which according to him are more excellent 
than values and universal ethics, to which every military code should submit.224 For him, 
Wisdom, Justice, Fortitude, and Temperance are timeless, cross-cultural virtues that can 
never be negotiated.225 These two recommendations—the first with a chain of moral 
reasoning and the second with a universal ethical code—only corroborate the concepts of 
fidelity to the virtue and moral universality of military ethics, ostensibly defended by all 
the authors hitherto studied. 
Thus, Section V of the book The Future of the Army Profession can be summed up 
in five short statements: 
1. Postmodern society corrupts characters in the most diverse social spheres. 
2. The military ethos is rooted in transcendent truth. 
3. The moral standard must remain unchanged throughout the entire process 
of adapting the expertise of the armed forces. 
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4. Three areas to consider and help a military professional to solve ethical 
problems: customs, rules, and outcomes. 
5. A military man should be a good man, and as a leader, know when to 
follow orders and when not to. 
B. CONCLUSION 
There are moral values that can be considered universal. These values are common 
to several cultures and people throughout the history of mankind. Such moral values, 
independent of the ethical characteristics of each people cannot be ignored, and they are 
the expression of what it is to be human. Because of this, these values are the origin of 
ethics and being aligned with them is considered ethical. The military in general and the 
Brazilian Air Force in particular play a role as guardians of ethics in society and must 
incorporate the highest moral standards in a nation. These ethical standards are not 
intrinsic, nor can they be transmitted only by organizational culture; they must be instilled 
through an organized educational process. This moral-educational process should teach 
military personnel to consider customs, laws, and outcomes; to develop a fidelity to virtue, 
independent from codes; and to figure out what kind of mission is righteous and what is 
not. Nevertheless, due to social pressure to equate military professionals with their 
“equivalents” in civil society, values of business dynamics have been adopted by military 
institutions due to their successful employment in various branches of society. 
Nevertheless, the FAB, as well as the armed forces in general, must refrain from adopting 
values, techniques, or procedures originating in the civilian society without proper their 
adaptation to the reality of the barracks, and the singularity of military institutions, their 
values, and their mission. 
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IV. MILITARY EDUCATION 
The preceding chapters discussed the professional and ethical foundations of 
military institution building through the process of analysis and interlacing of concepts. 
This chapter describes how these ethical and professional principles are absorbed by future 
members of the armed forces during the education process. Following the same modus 
operandi used to unravel military ethics, the first step in the analysis of educational precepts 
is to check the general concepts of moral education before applying any research 
specifically related to military education. To achieve this goal, this chapter provides a 
review of the main concepts of military education. 
A. OVERVIEW OF EDUCATION AND MILITARY EDUCATION 
CONCEPTS 
The author who stood out for his many works in the field of moral education was 
Lawrence Kohlberg. For a more focused analysis of Kohlberg’s extensive work, this thesis 
uses the book Lawrence Kohlberg: Educação Ética e Moral (Lawrence Kohlberg: Ethics 
and Moral Education), by Angela Biaggio. This book sums up the evolution of Kohlberg’s 
theories throughout his professional life, and how this was reflected in the conduct of his 
professional and scholarly work. 
Biaggio demonstrates how Lawrence Kohlberg’s thinking was influenced by the 
ideas of the philosopher Immanuel Kant, the sociologist Émile Durkheim, and the 
psychologist Jean Piaget.226 Kohlberg used Kant’s categorical imperative concept, which 
establishes the universal principles of morality227—very much in line with the Tao concept 
or universal ethics illustrated by C. S. Lewis.228 Kant expresses that all laws when, they are 
right, would be derived from and would reveal a superior, primary, and absolute law. This 
is summed up in Kant’s formula of autonomy, which requires each person to “treat each 
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person as an end and not as a means.”229 For Kohlberg, therefore, there are universal values 
that hover above culture and everyday values stemming from legalism.230 
Kohlberg also appropriates a Durkheim concept that deals with the importance of 
the collective in the construction of the individual. Durkheim has shown that educational 
institutions include moral instruction not only in their explicit curriculum but also through 
their “hidden curriculum,” which consists of their disciplinary rules and procedures, 
authority structure, prize distribution and punishment, and norms and values shared.231 
According to Biaggio, Kohlberg believes that, in addition to the work to be done with the 
curriculum to improve the ethical aspects, it should be considered that the academic system, 
composed of this “hidden curriculum” of moral education, must also be perfected.232 The 
existence of this “hidden curriculum” in the military education system, or informal 
curriculum based on traditions and organizational culture, appears to be decisive in the 
process of building the military ethos described in Janowitz’s works233 (with a sense of 
fraternity corresponding to institutional values that go beyond the curriculum) and Toner234 
(with the valorization policies of the staff corresponding to the expected behavior of future 
officials). It is also endorsed by Moskos and Wood235 (with the incorporation of a belief 
system personified by the active-duty officers) in an essay in their book. 
Finally, the last theoretical influencer of Kohlberg was Jean Piaget, who established 
a definition of stages of the moral reasoning. For Piaget, morality can be defined as an 
attitude of respect for people and rules based on a principle of universal morality, 
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something very much in line with Kant’s categorical imperative.236 Piaget delineated and 
named three levels of moral stages:237 
1. The pre-moral stage, where there is no motivation for submission to the 
rules; 
2. The heteronymous stage, where there is a feeling of obligation to the rules 
and submission to the constituted powers, aligned with the notion of 
punishment arising from the breaking of these rules; and 
3. The autonomous stage, where the objectives for the existence of the rules 
and the consequences of the institution of the rules are considered. At this 
stage, the obligation is based on reciprocity and exchange.  
For both Piaget and Kohlberg, stages are structured systems that form an invariable 
sequence under all conditions, except in situations of trauma, and are hierarchical 
integrations; that is, higher-stage thinking comprises being able to think in lower stages.238 
Following Piaget’s ideas, Kohlberg understands that moral development is built primarily 
through social interaction. Thus, social interaction rich in moral dilemmas significantly 
contributes to moral development.239 From this perspective, schools and military education 
courses could help the individual to develop morally by providing moments of discussion 
of moral dilemmas. As a result of his research, Kohlberg identifies three levels of moral 
development: pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional,240 each subdivided 
into two stages, making up a total of six moral stages:241  
• Stage I: Morality of punishment and obedience (physical consequences 
determine what is right). 
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• Stage II: Morality of instrumental hedonism (that which satisfies one’s 
needs is what is right). 
• Stage III: Morality of the “good boy - good girl” (maintaining good 
relations with others and obtaining their approval is what is right). 
• Stage IV: Morality of maintenance “of law and order” (obedience to 
authority and duty is what is right). 
• Stage V: Morality of contract, individual rights and democratically 
accepted law (standards critically examined and supported by society as a 
whole determine what is right). 
• Stage VI: Morality of the individual principles of consciousness (the 
decision of one’s conscience, according to the principles chosen by him, 
based on logical comprehensibility, universality, and consistency, 
determines what is right). 
It is essential to make clear that moral stages are conceptualizations of moral 
reasoning and not of moral content. In other words, when faced with a dilemma, it is not 
so much the choices made, but the kind of logic that leads to action, regardless of the trend. 
According to Kohlberg, there is sufficient evidence that the sequence of stages is 
universal and that there is a core of universal values, such as causing no harm to others, 
remaining loyal, keeping promises, and respecting human life. Culture would act as a 
modulating factor, accentuating some values and types of moral reasoning and diminishing 
others, but without negating a human essence common to all of them242something also 
demonstrated by Lewis in his concept of the Tao.243 Then, Kohlberg’s thoughts lead us to 
conclude that a proper morality is based on universal principles applicable to all mankind. 
On the other hand, everyday morals are more grounded in “do-or-not-do” rules. Hence, 
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Kohlberg’s conclusion is that principles guide moral decision making, and are freely 
chosen because of their intrinsic moral validity, while laws are grounded in social authority. 
According to Biaggio, most citizens in Brazilian and American societies are 
classified at the conventional level.244 At this level are stages III and IV described earlier. 
These are the levels of internalization of moral principles, when a person believes in the 
value of what he considers correct, acting in the name of friendship, acceptance of his 
companions or established law and order.245 According to Biaggio, the average Brazilian, 
at age 16, is in stage III (interpersonal agreement and compliance).246 In moving students 
beyond this stage during their military education, it is important to consider the following: 
• only 3 to 5 percent of people in society reach stage VI;247 
• military ethics, according to Toner, should guide the soldier beyond 
obedience, distinguishing the honorable from the shameful;248 and 
• the soldier’s moral commitment in the face of an immoral order, as 
discussed by Huntington.249 
It appears education in military schools should focus on increasing the moral 
judgment of students to reach stage V (where the ability to distinguish between a fair law 
and an unfair law is present). This goal is reinforced by Biaggio’s statement that the most 
common target in moral education is to direct a person to a stage immediately above the 
stage he or she occupies. Looking again at the assertion that Brazilian society would be 
between levels III and IV, a goal of stage V would be realistic and plausible. 
Given this scenario about education and the consequences in the military education 
system, it is imperative to analyze some specific assertions about education in the armed 
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forces. The book Military Education: Past, Present, and Future, by Gregory C. Kennedy 
and Keith Neilson, performs this task.250 In this book, Andrew Lambert demonstrates that 
military education does not consist of the “acquisition of skills in tasks that can be 
objectively tested.”251 In fact, education is designed to prepare great leaders, not merely 
great warriors. A well-educated combatant must be able to plan his actions and lead his 
subordinates guided by the fundamental values of his education.252 It is technical education 
combined with moral education. The complexity of the war generates an environment of 
novelties and constant uncertainties. In this scenario, it is education rather than training 
that prepares officers to analyze the context and make coherent decisions; and to develop 
new perspectives and deal with change.253 
Faced with the importance of education for the effectiveness of the armed forces, 
Lambert warns that the constant practice of end activity (in the case of the military, war) is 
the source for a continual process of improvement that leads to professional education to 
fulfill its role effectively. In the words of the authors themselves, “the understanding that 
experience has been the basis of every effective system of military education is central to 
modern military professionalism.”254 Thus, the more an army fights wars, the more 
prepared it is to wage war. Faced with this, a paradox presents itself. Lambert reiterates the 
thoughts of General Moltke255 in stating that “the only substitute for experience is the 
experience of others in the same profession.”256 Military journals, educational exchanges, 
joint seminars, and even the study of the experiences and practices of other armed forces 
in other nations can and should remedy any lack of experience of the national armed forces. 
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The author presents a practical solution concerning educational policy to be 
implemented by an armed force determined to perfect its professional experience within 
an efficient education system. Lambert speaks to “the need [of] a balanced program, 
focused on the study of war, from all disciplinary perspectives and, like On War, founded 
on history.”257 That is, all disciplines of a military curriculum deal with various 
perspectives and approaches; war is the hardcore of all academic planning, drawing on 
shared historical experiences to illustrate theoretical concepts, transporting those concepts 
to a more practical dimension where they can be confirmed or refuted. Also, according to 
Castro in The Invention of the Brazilian Army, constant contact with past achievements and 
with heroes and leaders who embody values and military morale helps strengthen the 
organizational values and institutional profile necessary for the military effectively fulfills 
its mission.258 In fact, this mindset demonstrates how crucial it is in the military educational 
system to understand past experiences and their use for the development of their future.259 
Since this educational system turned to military history ends up (but providentially) to 
promote institutional values and their symbolism, this corroborates Kohlberg’s precept260 
about the existence of a hidden curriculum that exists in parallel to the formal curriculum 
and which nevertheless supports the maintenance of institutional values. 
Analyzing the competition between Science and Technology versus Liberal Arts,261 
Kennedy and Neilson’s book seems to agree with Moskos,262 Toner,263 and especially 
Gabriel,264 who put ethics and moral teaching as a center of gravity around which all other 
professional skills of the military revolve. Initially, Kennedy and Neilson’s book 
emphasizes the conflictive environment of military education, where the clash between 
                                                 
257 Lambert, 99. 
258 Castro, 7. 
259 Lambert, 83, 98. 
260 Biaggio, 53. 
261 Kennedy and Neilson, 11. 
262 Moskos and Wood, 5. 
263 Toner, 6. 
264 Gabriel, 57–58. 
58 
institutional and occupational social organization are present (using the terms established 
by Moskos and Wood). Later in their work, though, the authors establish the importance 
of leadership, judgment, independence of thought, analytical skills, and critical self-
sufficiency to the detriment of technology.265 This type of analysis makes clear that these 
qualities are timeless, appearing since the time of Roman Legions until the concepts of 
Clausewitz. Although moral education is not an exact science, it is responsible for giving 
the necessary cohesion to military schools in the process of building united and 
professional military forces.266 The Lieber rules, approved by Abraham Lincoln in 1863, 
are proof that moral thinking and behavior is a need and not a choice: “Men who take up 
arms against one another in public war do not cease on this account to be moral beings, 
responsible to one another and to God.”267 
To summarize, Lawrence Kohlberg’s studies combined with principles of moral 
education pointed out by Toner and Gabriel indicate that society expects members of the 
military to develop their moral judgment at the post-conventional level in stages V and VI 
of Kohlberg. Since it is difficult for most people to reach stage VI, and Brazilian society is 
mostly at stage IV, the aim of military moral education should be to guide future officers 
to reach Kohlberg’s stage V, where the ability to distinguish a just law from an unjust law 
is present. At the same time, the considerations of Kennedy and Neilson indicate that, given 
the high professional standards required of the military in fulfilling complex and vital 
missions, education must have priority in the planning process of the military. Unlike 
training, education prepares leaders to analyze and to act in the chaotic and uncertain 
environment of war. Since only experience can provide an efficient education process, lack 
of experience must be overcome by combining moral education with technical education 
planning centered on military history. 
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Finally, considering the book The Future of the Army Profession, John Brinsfield, 
the author of the article “Reality Check: The Human and Spiritual Needs of Soldiers and 
How to Prepare them for Combat,” stresses the importance of military education 
institutions being prepared to enhance the spirituality and religiosity of military personnel 
during educational process.268 According to Brinsfield, spiritual needs are a reality for the 
military of the future.269 For him, spirituality and religiosity, aligned with morality, must 
be seen as a natural expression of human beings and culture, and these qualities can be a 
tool for the improvement of the soldier as a professional.270 These statements can be better 
understood if they are analyzed in the light of Lewis’ concepts of universal morality and 
transcendental truth as the origin of military morality as set forth by Toner,271 since both 
defend that religion is one of the sources of objective values. 
Just as Brinsfield addresses the intangible sphere of the educational process, Joe 
LeBoeuf addresses the tangible realm in his case study “The 2000 Army Training and 
Leader Development Panel.” Speaking about the American Army’s Officer Training 
System (OES), LeBoeuf argues that the system should adapt to the operational needs of 
this modern world.272 Given this, the first adaptation he cites is the need for a continuing 
education system, which begins in the early stages of the military purse and accompanies 
the military throughout its career.273 LeBoeuf also states that the focus of this new military 
education system should be on regional threats and full-spectrum operations.274 The U.S. 
Army defines full-spectrum operations as “the combination of offensive, defensive, and 
either stability operations overseas or civil support operations on U.S. soil.”275 This concept 
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of Full-Spectrum closely resembles the concept of constabulary force pointed out by 
Janowitz276 and ratified by Snider and Watkins.277 Another crucial point cited by LeBoeuf 
is that “officers must be trained to a set of common standards, those that certify 
professionals to the nation, consistent with the emerging principles of officership.”278 Thus, 
the education system must find a common core in the officer’s military education, which 
at the same time meets the professional demands and social validations pointed out by 
James Burk.279 Thus, since technical competencies are specific to each FAB officer’s 
specialty, military disciplines linked to the constabulary force profile, for guard and 
security of facilities, for example, should be considered common to all officers and should 
be standardized to increase effectivity. Likewise, disciplines related to military ethics could 
be standardized and, following the Kennedy and Neilson recommendations, those related 
to military history. 
Finally, one of Burk’s strongest educational recommendations says that “only the 
best-qualified, most experienced officers should be teachers, mentors and role models 
in…service school.”280 That is, it corroborates the policy of valuing the informal 
curriculum, as was approached by Biaggio in her book about Kohlberg.281 A career plan 
for the officers, aimed at teaching professionals should be developed, valuing education 
organizations, boosting academic production, and providing models capable of optimizing 
military socialization and incorporating values by example. 
The two essays related to education from the book The Future of the Army 
Profession can be summarized in three points: 
1. Military education institutions must to be prepared to use the spirituality 
and religiosity of military personnel to construct the military character. 
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2. The focus of the military education system should be on regional threats 
and full-spectrum operations. 
3. Only the best qualified, most experienced officers should be teachers and 
mentors.  
B. CONCLUSION 
Due to the high degree of complexity of war and the fulfillment of missions in the 
conduct of combat, the military education process must be considered a priority in the 
Ministry of Defense, in the Brazilian Armed Forces and in the FAB itself. Although 
training is necessary, only the education process can prepare leaders for the conduct of 
wars, not just warriors who will fight them. Since FAB combat experiences go back to 
World War II, an education system based on military history and based on case studies, 
exchanges and joint missions, focusing on full-spectrum operations, is the most appropriate 
way to accumulate the experience needed to accomplish the task. With this focus, 
incorporating moral education into technical-professional education is essential. Thus, 
through the experiences shared by other armed forces and other nations, and through the 
aforementioned techniques, the objective of the FAB should be to promote the 
development of the moral reasoning of its officers to reach the post-conventional level. At 
this level, they will be able to distinguish a fair law from an unjust law. That is, they will 
be able to identify that a norm may be lawful but may not be moral. Finally, an education 
career plan must be developed to incrementally increase the proportion of competent 
officer-teachers in organization of education. 
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V. HISTORY OF THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY AND 
SOCIALIZATION IN MILITARY ACADEMIES 
Analyzing the military history of a nation is not a simple task. Because the 
armed forces constitute a unique institution, apart from society, with its own rules and 
conduct, its history also unfolds apart from society on many occasions. Cultural 
influences that modify society do not necessarily have the same impact inside the 
barracks. In order to effectively perform a historical analysis of the organizational 
culture and the values that characterize the Brazilian Armed Forces, this chapter first 
demonstrates that Brazilian military traditions, which sustain organizational culture 
and indirectly also support institutional values, are often invented with the aim of 
fostering a specific morality. To demonstrate this, this chapter presents phases of 
Brazilian history that were relevant to the cultural construction of today’s Brazilian 
Armed Forces, highlighting some of the moral values and perceptions that the military 
has of itself and society. Finally, the chapter concludes by showing how the military 
ethics that were presented in the previous chapter and the organizational culture built 
during Brazilian history are used in the process of ethical education and socialization 
of the future members of the Brazilian Armed Forces and, specifically, of the FAB. 
A. THE MILITARY AND THE BRAZILIAN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
According to the theories of Hobsbawm and Castro presented in Chapter I, the 
Brazilian military makes and uses invented traditions reflected in symbols, rituals, 
ceremonies, and historical figures and events, with the purpose of constructing an ethic 
unique to the military and capable of meeting its institutional demands. For a more 
accurate understanding of this historical construction of the military character, whose 
traditions were constructed within a particular socio-cultural context, it is necessary to 
analyze this context before attempting to understand its rites and traditions. Looking 
to Appendix A, which presents the social framework of organizational culture 
generated in the monarchic period up to the early years of the Old Republic (1889–
1930), it is evident that the period was marked by the spontaneous development of 
traditions and moral values that have continued in the FAB up to today. Frank McCann, 
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in his book Soldados da Pátria, affirms that the Brazilian Army ranks were filled by 
criminals, poor people, and any kind of social slag at that time.282 Smallman, in the 
book Fear and Memory in the Brazilian Army and Society, similarly notes that “many 
officers came from poorer provinces, and it was not uncommon for them to come from 
families of declining fortune seeking to ensure that their sons would not sink into 
poverty and disgrace.”283 From this situation arose a worrisome domestic 
heterogeneity and a sense of alienation between the army and the dominant classes. 
Yet, the same army was designed to serve as an instrument of order defending the 
privilege of the slaveholding elites.284 But the landholding class did not trust the army, 
which created tension between the Brazilian military and the political elites.285 
Because that tension allied with a rising positivist ideology,286 the army doubted both 
the willingness and the capability of the traditional elites to solve Brazil’s problems. It was 
during this period that Brazilian officers began to think of the army as the “nation’s savior,” 
which became an important aspect of the military’s depiction of itself.287 The tense relation 
between the authorities and the army created military officers riddled by resentment; they 
started to see themselves as the only ones who could break a failed order of political games 
and construct a new one. From 1920 onward this phenomenon continued, but it was 
accompanied by invented traditions that would reinforce certain moral values and 
specific ethics in the face of a cultural reality that needed to be combated or even 
eliminated, according to the institutional vision of the military proposed by the 
generals. 
In sum, the historical events created an organizational culture in which the Brazilian 
military feels itself the most qualified to watch over the integrity of the nation and its 
institutions. The incorporation of mestizos and blacks into the ranks of the Brazilian Army 
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still at its inception helped to strengthen this idea that all races meet democratically in the 
armed forces. Moreover, the military maintains a bond of distrust before the constituted 
civil authorities, since the same positivist operational culture mentioned previously ends 
up valuing technical competence, something that is not seen in the politicians. The 
combination of these two factors ultimately led the Brazilian military to perceive itself as 
morally superior and to take on the role of homeland saviors, a vision that has ended up 
being shared by a large part of the population. This tendency of military members to view 
themselves as moral guardians of society is something defended by Toner and Gabriel. 
Institutional isolation from the premise that the military’s ethical and technical 
qualifications make its members different from civil society is also something that 
Huntington and Moskos and Wood acknowledge. Samuel Finer, also recognizes that same 
premise.288 In the book The Man on Horseback, Finer affirms that in societies with 
primitive economies, and even in more advanced societies like Brazil, the military is used 
to improve the economy through its advanced technology and equipment.289 The danger 
lies in the military allowing itself to be induced to use these premises to legitimize 
interventions in the national democratic order,290 something that has happened repeatedly 
throughout Brazilian history.291 Faced with this, in the process of forming the military 
character, educators should pay attention to the diffusion of the characteristics identified 
earlier but combat misinterpretation regarding the use of these characteristics. 
B. THE INVENTED TRADITIONS 
The first tradition to be analyzed will be the veneration of the greatest hero of the 
Brazilian Army, its Patron, the Duke of Caxias. 
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1. The Duke of Caxias 
In the 1920s, divisions within the Brazilian Armed Forces were furthered by 
political polarization between the left and right, leading to a series of revolts known as 
the Tenentista Movement or Tenentismo, headed mostly by junior officers. These 
revolts were suppressed with the Revolution of 30. In 1929, leaders of the Paulista 
(which in the Portuguese language means “from São Paulo”) oligarchy violated the 
alliance with the Minas Gerais’ leaders, a policy of coalition known as café com leite, 
when the Paulista President Washington Luiz, advocated another Paulista, Júlio 
Prestes, as the candidate for the presidency of the Republic.292 In reaction, the elites of 
Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul decided to support the candidacy of Getúlio 
Vargas, a former governor of that latter state.293 Vargas alleged a conspiracy that was 
justified by a possibility of fraud in the elections in March 1930, which would keep 
São Paulo in power once Julio Prestes won the election.294 Taking advantage of the 
demand for changes in politics and inside the army, Vargas colluded with the 
Tenentistas (a group of revolutionary junior officers, reformists and technocrats, with 
populist ideologies) to overthrow the government.295 Several disgruntled army 
officers, influenced by the Tenentistas and seeing São Paulo’s policy as damaging to 
the country, organized a revolt to change the government.296 Thus, the growth of the 
movement and the adhesion of a considerable number of officers of the military police 
led to a civil-military coup in October, 1930. “Collapsing from within, the army 
prevented a bloody civil war only by turning power to Vargas on November 3, 
1930,”297 since it failed to negotiate a new government acceptable to the 
revolutionaries.298 It was the end of the Old Republic in Brazil. Even so, no consensus 
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was reached within the army. Internal conflicts continued to be motivated by doctrinal, 
organizational, and political divergences.299 
Nevertheless, a movement seeking the isolation of the army from politics and 
social-cultural influences started to gain strength because the groups of conservative 
officers inside the Brazilian Army (the majority) realized that a possible consequence of 
the opening of society to the army was to open the army to society, making it more 
susceptible to external influences.300 This was considered detrimental to the integrity of the 
organization. The introduction of political factionalism was a significant obstacle to 
building a strong, disciplined, and efficient military structure, and threatened the power of 
the army as a political actor.301 
Solving the army’s institutional crisis and sustaining its integrity became the 
organization’s primary goal and involved, among other things, the adoption of a whole 
new set of symbolic elements. More than the reorganization of an institution divided 
by political and ideological issues, what resulted was “the invention of the Army as a 
national institution, inherited from a specific tradition and with a role to play in the 
construction of the Brazilian Nation.”302 Given this, the introduction of the Duke of 
Caxias as a patron of the Brazilian Army was an attempt to focus on the figure of a 
war hero, one who would gather in himself the qualities intended for all army officers, 
providing unity and a redirection of the army from business related to domestic 
politics.303 
To promote the necessary changes, the most important initiatives were directed 
toward the recruitment process of the Brazilian Military Academy, by restricting access to 
candidates coming from military schools, preparatory courses, or the ranks. Inside the 
military schools, the training itself began to give paramount importance to ideological 
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indoctrination, with a strong emphasis on ideological preparation as the very essence of the 
social policy of a modern army. The idea was to mirror the parallel effort of communism, 
teaching morals and civics to enlisted men and sociology, of all things, to cadets. On the 
negative side, legislation meant to forbid military involvement in partisan politics was 
introduced.304 At the same time, 107 officers and 1,136 noncommissioned officers and 
soldiers were expelled from the army between 1935 and 1938, accused of being 
communists, and many other less drastic forms of punishment were used that frequently 
resulted in irrevocable harm to an officer’s career, such as imprisonment, transfer, or 
reprimand.305 In sum, the history of the period between 1930 and 1937 is the story of how 
the army’s leadership fought civilian elites for control of the military. The changes in 
recruitment patterns, training, and promotion systems were only part of the project to 
consolidate the military and the political power of the armed forces. 
With this motivation, the content of the messages transmitted by the military 
chiefs about Caxias and the Day of the Soldier, after the 1920s and during the 1930s, 
would have the objective to function symbolically, internally to the institution, as an 
“antidote” against the indiscipline and politicization of the military.306 This objective 
is evident in an analysis of the speeches of various commanders of that time. One of 
them said that “when politics wants to take you in its deceptive plots trying to make 
you believe that it is not perjury the breaking of the duties of discipline and the 
insurgency against the authorities, do not forget that Caxias, a mirror of loyalty, despite 
having militated in politics, he was constantly the impregnable bulwark of legality.”307 
Since 1930, the content of the messages on Caxias has emphasized not only legality 
and discipline but has presented Caxias as the greatest fighter for the unity and integrity 
of the homeland.308 
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Over the years, however, the figure of Caxias was not well understood by the 
soldiers. The extreme, almost mystical exaltation of Caxias turned him into an 
unattainable and inimitable model. Thus, the symbol lost the ability to promote an 
emotional connection with the troops, composed of “fallible beings” and full of too 
human weaknesses. The result ended up being the opposite of what one wanted to 
achieve with the exaltation of the Patron: “Caxias” came to designate an overly strict 
individual in discipline—a meaning which also spread among civilians.309 
Nonetheless, the image of an army united around the aura of the patriotism of the Duke 
of Caxias, despising the politicians and abstaining from the politics, continues until 
today. 
This withdrawal of the military from social and political conflicts is clear in the 
words of Colonel José Pessoa, who was responsible for the invention of new traditions 
in the Military School of Realengo, the military academy of the Brazilian Army at the 
time:310 
Cadets! The duty that the Army had to perform towards the Republic is 
already consummated. ... But the Revolution is not over yet, that is the 
order of the moment. The Republic is saved, it is left to save the Nation. 
To redeem the Republic was the means, to magnify the Nation is the 
only true purpose. Revalidated the form of government, it is necessary 
to restore Brazil. ... The Army, as a democratic institution par 
excellence, as a true bone of nationality is, by its very nature, the 
institution that must first and soon be recovered, so much so that the 
integrity of the Motherland, rather than that of the regime, rests in its 
efficiency. 
For Colonel Pessoa, military policy and discipline were two things that should 
not be mixed.311 One of his measures to strengthen discipline was the creation of the 
Cadet Corps of the Brazilian Army. A set of symbols was created that expressed the 
cadets’ belonging to a tradition linked to what was considered to be the deepest 
national values. With the creation of the Cadet Corps, the student enrolled in the school 
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was now considered part of a collective entity.312 In his own words after four years of 
command, “an ideology has been created, which is a mixture of “Brazilianness” and 
military sentiment, amalgamated by the cult of the past, by the spirit of tradition.”313 
Thus, the symbolism of the removal of military life in relation to civil life, represented 
in the creation of a unique entity and separated from the civilian reality (the Corps of 
Cadets) with its own symbolism and rituals, played a fundamental role in the social 
framework of the Brazilian Army, and consequently, of the FAB that we have today. 
A parallel between the Duke de Caxias and the Brazilian aviator Alberto 
Santos-Dumont can be quickly established. Santos-Dumont was an idealist endowed 
with intellectual and imaginative capacities above average and ahead of his time. 
Considered by Brazilians as “the father of aviation,” after success with balloons and 
airships, Santos-Dumont went on to another line of research: flying with a vehicle 
heavier than air. After two unsuccessful attempts, on October 23, 1906, the dream 
materialized: at the Bagatelle Field in Paris, France, a crowd saw their first aircraft, the 
14-Bis, fly for 60 meters and land without difficulty.314 The Brazilians and French 
consider this the first time that man managed to take off and land by his own means 
on an object heavier than air. Santos-Dumont made his last flight in September 1909. 
During his lifetime, he was responsible for the creation of several inventions, among 
them the hot shower and the wristwatch. In June 1931, he was elected a member of the 
Brazilian Academy of Letters.315 With this enviable curriculum vitae, it was not 
difficult to establish him as the Patron of Aeronautics and to extract from his life the 
example of values linked to courage, innovation, and intelligence, desired attributes in 
any official. His life is celebrated every year in military ceremonies throughout the 
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country and his achievements are remembered through continuous references within 
the FAB’s organizational culture. 
The same happened with the figure of Eduardo Gomes, who in 1991, ten years after 
his death, received the title of Patron of the FAB. Born in 1896, Eduardo Gomes graduated 
from the Military School of the Brazilian Army in 1918 and participated in some of the 
famous historical episodes such as the movement of “The 18 of the Fort,” the Revolution 
of 1924, the fight against the Communist Intentona of 1935, and the anti-submarine patrol 
on the coast of Brazil during the Second World War, when he commanded aerial units. He 
was also responsible for the precursor of the National Air Mail (CAN) and twice Minister 
of Aeronautics. Finally, he was one of the few military men to reach the rank Marshal-of-
Air.316 His life is shrouded in a mystique that transformed him into a synonym for various 
moral values venerated within the FAB. 
2. The Communist Intentona 
Another fact of great importance for the understanding of the formation of 
Brazilian military culture was the frustrated communist revolt of November 1935, 
since it promoted the anti-communist ideology inside the armed forces.317 
After the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Brazilian Communist Party was 
created in 1922. With the conversion of the leader of the Tenentista Movement, Luís 
Carlos Prestes, to communism, the strengthening of communist ideology with the 
support of the Tenentes, and the emergence of the political group the Alliance National 
Liberation Army (ALN) that was dominated by the communists,318 there was the real 
intention of the communists to come to power by revolutionary means. 
The Tenentes employed careful organization and propaganda as they subverted 
Brazilian troops to their movement. Aided by a faction of civilian elites, the Tenentes 
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enjoyed great success in their effort. At the time, the army’s leaders would face a movement 
that not only rallied widespread support within the institution, but also had powerful 
civilian allies. The Tenentes had always believed that because of officers’ technical skills, 
they could offer a dispassionate vision that could serve as a basis to modernize the nation. 
They thought that regional elites had co-opted military superiors, who had been too willing 
to have the army serve as a tool of special political interests. According to the Tenentes, 
they would be different.  
It was in this context that a communist revolt broke out in Natal, Recife, and in 
Rio de Janeiro, in 1935. Involving members of the Brazilian Army and linked to the 
Comintern—the International Communist organization—the rebels were quickly 
defeated by the central government. The episode was called the Intentona—a 
Portuguese word that means a crazy intent, foolish plan, folly—a name that in itself 
helped to build the mythology behind the event: heroic soldiers saving the nation from 
evil and crazy communists.319 Getúlio Vargas—who assumed control of the Brazilian 
government after the 1930 coup and ruled the country until 1945, as provisional 
president (1930–1934), constitutional president (1934–1937) and dictator (1937–
1945)—and the military commanders promoted strong repression, expelling all left-
wing military from the armed forces.320 Although the opposition to communism within 
the organization preceded this episode, it was from the Intentona that the communists 
came to be identified as the greatest enemy.321 In Castro’s words, “this process had as 
its focal point the institutionalization, by the military, of commemoration on the 
anniversary of the victory over the Intentona. The ritual of remembrance of the dead 
loyal to the government, repeated every year in Rio de Janeiro, made their sacrifice 
present, renewed the anti-communist vows of the military and socialized the new 
generations in the same spirit.”322 
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The military regime initiated in 1964 further reinforced the idea of the 
communist threat. The regime promoted the concept that, in 1935 and in 1964, the 
communists attempted an onslaught, which was hampered by the guardians of the 
nation, the saviors of the homeland, the armed forces. The association between 1935 
and 1964 became mandatory.323 In the words of the commander of the II Army, in 
commemoration of the defeat of the Intentona, in 1976, the mention of two military 
men considered traitorsone in the Intentona, another in the military 
regimereinforced the symbolic link between 1935 and 1964: “In our barracks no 
more Lamarcas will appear, no more Agildos Baratas will appear, because our quarters 
are now purified.”324 
3. The Guararapes Battle 
Despite the strong anti-socialist and anti-communist sentiment that is part of 
the organizational culture of the Brazilian Armed Forces, the democratization of Brazil 
and the assumption of five consecutive governments linked to left-wing political 
parties, rituals, and symbols connected to the counterrevolution of 1964 and the defeat 
of the Communist Intentona of 1935 lost their strength and effectiveness. To take their 
place, in 1994, on the date of the First Battle of Guararapes, a new ritual was invented. 
In 1648, the Battle of Guararapes marked the moment when local troops, composed of 
units of whites, blacks, and Indians, using irregular tactics of war, defeated a superior 
enemy in number and equipment, expelling the Dutch troops that occupied the region 
of Pernambuco between 1630 and 1654. In Castro’s words, “the central idea of the 
new commemoration is that in Guararapes would have been born at the same time as 
the Brazilian nationality and Army.”325 This idea is reinforced by the symbolism of 
three races—the white, black and Indian—who constitute the Brazilian people, 
fighting side by side to protect territory and national identity. The internal enemy, 
represented by communism, has lost part of its force against the foreign enemy, the 
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foreigner who invades Brazil to steal its wealth.326 Analyzing the documents in the 
national defense area it is easy to establish a parallel with the riches of the Amazon 
and the doctrines of resistance and tactics developed to protect the region. 
4. The Brazilian Expeditionary Force 
The history of Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) started in the Getúlio Vargas 
Government. Vargas was a dictator in the mold of European fascism, establishing 
relationships with Nazi Germany at the beginning of the Estado Novo. During the war, 
Vargas broke with Germany and went on to support the allied powers. The most influential 
groups within Brazilian politics, including Vargas, believed that Brazil would benefit by 
participating in the war, and the Estado Novo would be preserved.327 Minister of War Dutra 
was tasked to organize an expeditionary force (FEB) to fight Germany, however, with little 
support from the general staff, which was against this decision.328 Inside the Brazilian 
Army a myth was created that the contact with U.S. troops in Italy led the FEB to adopt 
democratic and liberal values, which contributed to Vargas’s downfall in 1945.329 
Several historians have generally agreed that the FEB had a profound impact on the 
Brazilian Army. Some of them will defend the view that the FEB was a relevant factor in 
consolidating the base for the coup of 1964 and the military regime that followed. These 
historians say that the FEB330 was used to create the idea of the Brazilian Army hero: an 
idealist, nationalist and attached to values such as freedom and democracy. This idea was 
essential to validate the military regime after 1964, despite the FEB being formed by 
nationalist forces sympathetic to Vargas and by some groups connected with the 
Communist parties and organizations, which spent years struggling against the army’s high 
command before violence smashed their political influence in 1952.331 
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The Brazilian Air Force also made use of this same dynamic of the Brazilian 
expeditionary heroes who went to fight in unknown lands, risking their lives in the name 
of democracy and freedom. The creation of the 1st Fighter Group, composed only by 
volunteer aviators332 most of whom lost their lives in combat in Italy in the 1940s,333 
constitutes the basis of Brazilian aeronautical mythology. This critical episode in the 
history of the FAB reverberates in the present-day ceremonies of great importance that 
extend reverence to the memory of those who died in Italy, and helped to create the 
mystique necessary to forge heroes who represent the values that should be shared by the 
troops.334 
Thus, it is clear that rituals and symbology play a fundamental role in the 
shaping of the Brazilian military ethos, and which is essential for the existence of any 
social group. Castro states that “it is not enough for individuals to think that they are 
part of a particular community: we must act, and act in common. It is necessary also 
to celebrate—remember together. Through rituals, beliefs become effectively social to 
their participants. It is the regular and collective repetition of the rituals that creates 
and recreates the collective itself as such, renewing in its participants the feeling of 
belonging to something in common,”335 in this case, the Brazilian Armed Forces. 
To sum up, the invention of traditions around historical figures (such as Santos 
Dumont, Eduardo Gomes, and Caxias) or around historical events (such as the Communist 
Intentona, the Battle of the Guararapes, and the Expeditionary Forces of the Army and Air 
Force) has been used to shape moral values essential for the organizational culture of the 
Brazilian military. These traditions help to ground the mystique of the antiquity of military 
values, elevating them to the almost mythical status. 
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Courage, patriotism, self-sacrifice, discipline, initiative, and ingenuity are just some 
of the qualities identified in these traditions and historic figures and are perpetuated year 
after year to generations of new members of the Brazilian Armed Forces. This makes it 
clear that any military education process that wants to inculcate values and generate 
institutional socialization in its new military men must invest in the intense ritualism and 
worship directed at current symbols, heroes, and historical episodes that represent the 
ethics one wants to forge in new professionals of the armed forces. 
C. MILITARY SOCIALIZATION PROCESS 
The Brazilian Air Force was created in 1941 by President Getúlio Vargas, who 
transferred to the new institution military personnel, civilian professionals, airplanes, and 
facilities, of the Brazilian Navy and the Army. As early as 1941, the Aeronautical School 
was created (to educate and train officers), as was the School of Aeronautical Experts (for 
education and training of graduates), from the School of Military Aviation and the School 
of Naval Aviation until then belonging to the Brazilian Army and the Navy, respectively.336 
Thus, it is natural that part of the organizational culture and military ethics formed 
throughout the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century was transmitted to the 
Brazilian Air Force, along with the military from the other two branches of the armed 
forces. The author of this thesis, who for seven years worked at the Brazilian Air Force 
Academy (AFA), six of these years directly in the Aeronautical Cadet Corps (CCAER) can 
attest that many of the rituals practiced in that institution come mainly from the traditions 
initiated in the Academy Military of the Agulhas Negras (AMAN), belonging to the 
Brazilian Army, which in turn inherited its traditions from its older version, the Military 
School of Realengo. Thus, understanding the ethical motivations in AMAN is like 
investigating the beginnings of the ethical motivations practiced in the AFA.  
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The book Antropologia dos Militares, edited by Mauro Celso Castro and Piero 
Leirner, confirms Smallman’s337 and McCann’s338 statements about the military’s distrust 
of the ability of civilians to lead the nation, since it is clear that the military consider 
themselves to be intellectually, socially, and morally superior, due to the strength of the 
institution.339 This self-image constructed throughout history ends up creating a direct 
opposition between the military world and the civilian world, an opposition that is essential 
in the social framework and military identity.340 To Smallman, military personnel believe 
that they are capable technicians that carry the necessary knowledge and moral values to 
identify the nation’s needs and lead it through a crisis. Castro’s book sees the same thing, 
but as a result of the strength of the institution, it demands the isolation of its members 
from civil society. Anyway, that division between civilian and military is a reality and 
necessary to achieve the complete socialization that profession demands. 
Thus, not by the same routes mapped by Huntington,341 Janowitz,342 and Moskos 
and Wood,343 but with the same consequences, the Brazilian Armed Forces are built up 
from the society they seek to preserve and defend, developing the idea of a “military 
family,” which is one of its fundamental concepts.344 At the same time, the Brazilian 
military strengthens the distinction between friends and foes, without a diffuse spectrum 
between these extremes, an important dichotomy in “military mythology.”345 From all that 
was presented, the Brazilian military confirms the studies of Moskos and Wood,346 
pointing out that the armed forces developed a process of socialization, centered in self-
sacrifice, that aims to give vocation to those who persevere and to forge a new 
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institutionalized individual.347 In this process, the small rituals and corporal expressions (a 
short haircut, for example) that develop within military education courses are essential in 
the formation of this institutional identity.348 
Then, those characteristics of social, cultural, and moral frameworks that could be 
identified within AMAN, also can be recognized within the AFA. Leal in her book 
Socialização em uma Instituição Total directly confirms theories from Castro’s book,349 
and consequently, Moskos and Wood’s conclusions,350 verifying that in the process of 
incorporation of the new cadets to the AFA, the mortification of the “self” and socialization 
with a transformation of identity351 is essential. This process is developed by 
methodologies, rituals, and symbolism very similar to those presented by Castro in AMAN. 
This agreement of Leal with Castro ends up confirming that part of the organizational 
culture of the FAB was inherited from the Brazilian Army, as already stated in this chapter. 
In this process of building the organizational culture of the FAB, Leal shows an 
educational paradox inside the AFA curriculum. According to her, the educational 
documents say that it is desirable to achieve in the AFA, on the one hand, the 
homogenization of behavior and unrestricted obedience, and on the other hand, the spirit 
of initiative, responsibility, and leadership (assuming autonomy). These two positions, 
however, eventually weaken, as opposed to mutually exclude, one another.352 Thus, Leal 
points out that the “mortification of the self” cannot be maintained throughout the process 
of education.353 This is extremely important for the development of the curriculum of the 
education courses of the FAB officers, since, by logical deduction, it is understood that 
they must go through a stage of personal identity breach and incorporation of collectivism. 
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Further, after the process of socialization has reached a point where the individual is 
institutionalized, he or she must be motivated to detach him- or herself from the collective, 
now no longer as the former citizen-civilian, but as the new citizen-soldier, to exercise this 
new individuality and autonomy in the field of battle. Leal uses a statement from 
Huntington that the military’s task is to know and to know how to devise strategies and 
tactics that are following the politically defined goals for the national state that he 
defends.354 Then, for her, not only the AFA but all officer courses have to construct an 
independent thinker together with a socialized military individual. As a consequence, the 
necessity of this mixture of subordination and homogeneity versus initiative and autonomy 
both in the AFA and in other FAB courses should balance institutional social organization 
and occupational social organization, confirming the views of Moskos and Wood,355 and 
to some degree, Janowitz.356 
Finally, in the analysis of Leal’s work, the importance given to Kohlberg’s357 
hidden curriculum,358 which appears in social relations and in the administrative conduct 
of military education courses, is also evident inside the AFA. Leal proves that informal 
curriculum is reinforced by the traditions, symbolism, and rituals present in the daily life 
of the barracks. All this confirms Kohlberg’s assertions that the hidden content, although 
not present in the curriculum, should at least be planned to avoid contradictions involving 
theoretical content and practical content. It is imperative this kind of planning to be 
included at a tactical level and supervised by the highest levels of FAB’s military 
education. 
In sum, the shaping of the organizational culture of the state and many of its 
institutions, including the military, inherits, in a natural and unplanned way, some 
traditions throughout its history. Many of the traditions of the Brazilian Armed Forces, 
though, were invented with the intent of interpreting specific moral values, such as 
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esprit de corps, for example, in periods of history when these values were threatened 
by cultural transformations in society. These social transformations could affect the 
integrity of occupational social organization (to draw on Moskos and Wood), 
interfering with the essence of the armed forces and altering their level of 
Responsibility and Corporateness (to use Huntington-defined terms). Through the 
veneration of heroes and historical episodes, ceremonies, and symbology, traditions 
are incorporated into the barracks, perpetuating a previously desired ethic. Since the 
primary function of military academies is to inculcate values and socialize the 
members of the armed forces, the educational processes in these places must be 
emphasized with all the legendary representativeness that guides the students in their 
individual transformation, which rises from a level of individualistic civilian life to a 
collective military being, something really close to some of McCann statements.359 
The focus on episodes in history that enhance institutional values, the use of symbols 
that embody military ethics, the encouraging of attitudes that symbolize a break with 
civilian life, or the exaltation of national heroes that represent and incorporate the 
desired stance in their soldiers—all these are techniques used in the process of military 
socialization, and should be integrated into military education courses. Thus, all these 
elements are essential guides for the beginning of the analysis of the military curricula 
of the FAB, which will be done in the next chapter, serving as clear parameters in the 
development of the professional profile that will determine which disciplines should 
be maintained, which ones should be modified, which ones should be eliminated, and 
which ones should be incorporated. If the analysis demonstrates that no change fits in 
the curricula when compared to these premises, then the hypothesis of this thesis will 
be wrong. But if the investigation shows an incompatibility between curricula and 
theory for the effective construction of efficient military ethics, then the conclusion of 
this thesis will expose, in the epilogue, the diagnosis and lines of action recommended 
to the FAB authorities for the improvement of the education of their officers. 
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VI. EDUCATION IN THE BRAZILIAN AIR FORCE 
This chapter describes the military curricula in the light of previously established 
professional, ethical, and educational premises, regarding the organizational culture of the 
FAB. The objective of this approach is to identify the consonances and dissonances of the 
current educational process with the necessary characteristics for the development of 
competent military professionals and to prepare them for the fulfillment of their 
constitutional missions. The focus of this review is the profile of the military member as a 
combatant and as an ethical individual since this is the focus of this thesis. 
A. MILITARY EDUCATION COURSES FOR OFFICERS IN THE FAB 
The main distinction between all the courses within FAB is “how” and “where” the 
professionals are prepared to actuate within the military. The Air Force Academy (AFA) 
and the Aeronautical Instruction and Adaptation Center (CIAAR) prepare officers from all 
territories to be actuated in all territories and so distributes them, after graduation, to 
military organizations scattered throughout the country. Education and training are 
centralized, i.e., unified in one place. This facilitates the supervision of the Directorate of 
Education (DIRENS) and the use of measures of technical standardization and, above all, 
the development of institutional values and the incorporation of organizational culture and 
military ethics. McCann testifies to this by saying that the disintegrated military training 
developed by the Brazilian Army in the first half of the 1900s had damaging effects on the 
social structure of the troops, a problem that was solved only with the standardization and 
centralization of teaching at the Agulhas Negras Military Academy.360 The sense of 
belonging to something bigger and older than Brazilian society itself is more present in this 
type of educational model, since the feeling about the greatness of the military is intensified 
when the student abandons his or her culture and region to be incorporated in an institution 
that puts all national representatives, together, in one place. On the other hand, Specialty 
of Convoked Officers (QOCON) personnel—Temporary Officers—are selected for a 
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specific locality to serve in the FAB. Usually, they are themselves representatives of those 
same local communities. Because a national law regulates this kind of military service, the 
Temporary Officers cannot be moved to other locations throughout their eight years of 
service. Since the military officer is entitled to financial compensation when he or she is 
moved, this measure also helps to relieve the military budget. Yet, since the Specialty of 
Convoked Officers (QOCON) personnel cannot be moved, their education and training 
process cannot be centralized, i.e., realized in the same place, which explains the necessity 
of the Regional Education Sections (SERENS) and a geographically scattered educational 
system.361 
If the data presented earlier highlights the importance of greater attention to the 
planning and development of the Military Education Courses for Temporary Officers, 
future prognoses only intensify this certainty. From 2010 through 2016 there was a 67 
percent increase in the hiring of temporary military personnel. In 2010, the number was 
4,986; in 2012, 5,983; and in 2016, there were 8,328 military personnel in the temporary 
cadres of sergeants and officers.362 The number is expected to increase further.363 
According to the strategic planning for the so-called Air Force 100, which outlines 
prospects for the FAB when it reaches its 100th anniversary in 2041,  
the recruitment dynamics should focus on structuring a mixed workforce 
with career professionals and temporary professionals, associated with the 
introduction of new weapons systems and concepts in the various areas, as 
a way of reducing the number of personnel in the area of support and 
strengthening those resources directed to the final activity.364 
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Occupational values may interfere with institutional values, as observed by Moskos 
and Wood,365 even more so if segregation in the training process exists, spreading around 
the country the military education courses for Temporary Officers, weakening FAB’s 
global culture and strengthening regional values. Likewise, the organizational culture of 
the FAB can be affected by the decrease in the number of career officers who should be 
replaced by Temporary Officers, which may compromise effectiveness, as stated by 
Gabriel366 and Toner.367 Reduced effectiveness means increased bureaucracy to conquer 
social legitimacy, which increases efficiency.368 The breakdown of this vicious circle 
depends on an increase in disciplines, first in the military field and then in the technical-
operational field, promoting an operational change to a hybrid profile to increase 
effectiveness,369 regardless of budget reductions. In addition, the rotation of these same 
temporary military personnel may make it difficult to maintain institutional values through 
the informal curriculum advocated by Kohlberg370 since these values should be reinforced 
with each generation that is replaced. Yet, there will be insufficient time for them to be 
incorporated in the organizational culture and to become propagators of institutional 
values, as officers with ten, 20, or 30 years of military service. 
B. CURRICULUM OF MILITARY EDUCATION COURSES 
In the Professional Profile of the Aeronautical Officer (PPOA)371 there is a 
professional profile considered common to all specialties. This common core should be 
used to improve effectiveness, as stated by Burk.372 The common profile encompasses 
knowledge, skills, and attitudes that make up part of the disciplines, most in the military 
field, which must be shared by all FAB’s junior officers. The universal competencies listed 
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in the PPOA that have some connection with the military ethics studied in this thesis and 
that are reproduced in all courses for career officers are: 
1. to cultivate ethical principles, values, and military duties, guiding their 
conduct by a line of correction of attitudes, both in civilian and military 
life; 
2. to cultivate leadership, responsibility, patriotism, a spirit of belonging in a 
team, and to seek continuous improvement; 
3. to understand the Basic Doctrine of the FAB, as well as to know the 
historical evolution of the military power, with emphasis on the aerospace 
power; 
4. to understand the documents and procedures applied to the administrative 
sphere of Military Judicial Police, to military police inquiry, the 
imprisonment of suspects in the act, the investigative process in 
administrative sphere, etc.;  
5. to know the constitutional responsibility of the armed forces and apply the 
basic foundations of law, in the areas of Constitutional Law, 
Administrative Law, Military Penal Process, Human Rights, and 
International Law of Armed Conflicts. 
6. to employ techniques of close combat and survival in a hostile 
environment, except for QOCAPL [chaplain]; 
7. to participate in training and military operations in Brazil and abroad, 
being able to work in Peacekeeping Operations and other missions in 
support of Brazilian foreign policy; 
8. to use, effectively, the armament of individual use made available by 
COMAER, except for QOCAPL [chaplain]; 
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9. to carry out maintenance actions of an organic level for the conservation 
of portable weapons, made available by COMAER, except QOCAPL 
[chaplain]; 
10. to command grouping or fraction of troops in graduation ceremonies, 
maneuvers, and military exercises; and 
11. to conduct the Officer-of-the-Day service or the services of proportionate 
to their responsibility. 
When referring to ethical principles and values, the PPOA does not make clear what 
principles and what values these would be, permitting subjectivity and doubts, which in 
most cases are subject to the interpretations given to these terms by the higher-ranking 
officers, according to their own experiences. This type of interpretation is subject to 
constant change, as those responsible for these decisions are replaced in their functions. 
In an attempt to minimize these doubts and standardize this interpretation, the FAB 
conceived an Aeronautical Command Manual (MCA) 909–1, called the Program for 
Teaching and Strengthening of Values (PFV). The manual establishes five central values, 
as defined in Aeronautical Command Guideline (DCA) 11–45 - Strategic Air Force 
Concept 100:373 discipline, professionalism, integrity, patriotism, and commitment. These 
values include a set of 18 additional values, extracted from Title II of the Military 
Statute,374 which codified the traditions and the Brazilian military organizational culture. 
So, as far as institutional values are concerned, they originate in the spontaneous or 
invented traditions that were codified in the Military Statute and drawn to Strategic Air 
Force Concept 100 and Aeronautical Command Manual (MCA) 909–1. They should be 
reflected in the PPOA, which in turn makes incorporates them into the courses for FAB 
officers. When the PPOA refers to military ethics and values, they should be understood 
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as those 23 values spelled out in the Aeronautical Command Manual (MCA) 909–1. 
Although the MCA 909–1 works perfectly as a code of honor, to instill true ethics 
embodying the virtues as advocated by Toner,375 independent of codes and laws, it requires 
an educational process focused on the concepts of universal ethics as presented by Lewis 
in his theory of the Tao.376 Obedience to laws and ordinances, the same category in which 
a moral code can be classified, is related to the conventional level of moral judgment, 
second to the theory of Kohlberg.377 And as discussed in this thesis, the post-conventional 
level is one that meets the needs for the formation of a military ethic that supports the three 
professional characteristics established by Huntington378—expertise, responsibility, and 
corporateness—at the same time that it allows the strengthening of the institutional social 
organization, as established by Moskos and Wood.379 
The educational process of the FAB officers begins with the definition of the 
curriculum, which seeks to meet the profiles outlined by the PPOA. The PPOA traces the 
military profile in a common way to all the staff, even the temporary military personnel. 
The document regulating entry and the duties assigned to Temporary Officers, however, 
makes a clear distinction between these professionals and the career military. Temporary 
Officers are employed in times of peace; that is, they will not compose troops on the 
battlefield.380 Thus, this distinction should appear more clearly in the PPOA, allowing the 
design of a curriculum that contemplates a greater emphasis on the profile of a constabulary 
force for Temporary Officers, and a hybrid profile in the development of other curricula. 
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The curricula and stages of military education in the FAB are divided into three 
fields of activity: general field, technical-specialized field, and military field.381 The first 
deals with academic disciplines, such as Public Administration, Law, and Analytic 
Geometry, and “provides, in addition to cultural and scientific support for the study of 
disciplines in the military and technical-specialized field.”382 The second group brings 
together the individuals “with specific content” such as Aerodynamics, Aerial Navigation, 
and Meteorology, “aimed at the technical and specialized training of the various 
professionals who make up the Aeronautical Personnel Staff.”383 Finally, the military field 
brings together disciplines with specific content aimed at training the military professional, 
such as Weapons, Ammunition, and Shooting. 
The military fields pertaining to the 12 FAB officer courses384 are divided into five 
different curriculum models since some of these courses share the same curriculum as the 
military area. The subjects related to these curricula are summarized in the Table 2, where 
they were classified by content similarity, although they have different names. Some 
subjects within the same curriculum were grouped under the same category, as is the case 
of military ethics and professional military ethics in the AFA curriculum, for example, that 
for this work were grouped in this table with the nomenclature “military ethics.” 
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Table 2. Officer’s Military Curricula in FAB. 
CAREER OFFICERS TEMPORARY OFFICERS 
AFA CIAAR SERENS 
CFO 
(AV/INT/INF) 
EAOEAER / EAIC / 
EAOAp / 
CAMAR/CADAR/CAFAR 
CFOE EAOF QOCON 
First Aids — First Aids — — 
































Intelligence Intelligence Intelligence Intelligence — 
Civil-military 
Behavior Civil-Military Education — — 
Civil-Military 
Education 
Military Doctrine — — — — 




(out of the 
military field) 
Military 
Profession Military Profession — — — 
Military History Brazilian Air Force History — — Brazilian Air Force History 
Parachuting — — — — 
Survival — — — — 
Military 

































— Armed Forces Structure —  Armed Forces 
— Safety at Work — Safety at Work — 
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CAREER OFFICERS TEMPORARY OFFICERS 
AFA CIAAR SERENS 
CFO 
(AV/INT/INF) 
EAOEAER / EAIC / 
EAOAp / 
CAMAR/CADAR/CAFAR 








— — Flight Safety — Flight Safety 
— Military Security — — Military Security 
— Security Exercises — Security Exercises — 
Leadership Leadership (out of the military field) 
Leadership 








of the military 
field) 
— — — — Military Hymns and Songs 
— Search and Rescue (EAOAp only) — — — 
 
Of all the disciplines in the military field, listed in Table 2, only six are present in 
all curricula: Physical Training; Weapons, Ammunition, and Shooting; Military Ethics; 
Military Legislation; Military Marching Drill; and Leadership. Of these six areas, 
Leadership appears within the military field only in the AFA curriculum, being in the 
general field in the other courses. Because of this distinction, Leadership is taught in the 
AFA from a military perspective, and is led by officers of the Cadet Corps (CCAER). In 
the CIAAR and SERENS courses, insertion of leadership material in the general field 
instead of the military field may allow an occupational or business emphasis, since the 
approach will seek academic references in civilian theorist, leading to critical institutional 
concepts linked to military ethics and military values to be replaced by corporate values, 
exactly as Gabriel and Moskos state. According to Gabriel, this type of content (with a 
strong civilian base) helps weaken the organizational culture of the military and, 
consequently, diminishes the effectiveness of the air force. Military Marching Drill; 
Weapons, Ammunition and Shooting; and Military Legislations are disciplines that can be 
considered technically military. Of these three subjects, Military Marching Drill may be 
90 
most commonly used to strengthen ethical concepts such as esprit de corps, hierarchy, and 
discipline. 
Finally, Military Ethics is the discipline most directly connected to the concepts of 
organizational culture, institutionalism, and military values. It can be divided into two 
different approaches: one is oriented more toward moral values and to organizational 
culture—more prominent in the AFA—and the other, a more technical-professional 
approach. The latter approach is preoccupied with international codes, when the discipline 
is called “Professional Military Ethics,” which is found in all courses. This is the only 
approach to ethics in the CIAAR courses and the courses taught by SERENS. To reconcile 
this approach to ethics unrelated to the concepts closest to institutional values, classes such 
as Junior Officers’ Behavior explain moral practices linked to the military profession, such 
as functions and values related to Junior Officers daily routine. The focus of this type of 
approach is more practical than theoretical. In this sense, the aforementioned material 
shares an expected behavior, modeling of the future officers, and is characterized by 
stimulating the imitation of an ideal posture in a passive way, without working with the 
abstraction and universality necessary to reach the level that requires officers to interpret 
the relativity as well as a preformed ethics. In the Junior Officers’ Behavior discipline, two 
of the objectives presented are “to explain the essence of the values inherent in military 
life” and “to justify the importance of the values inherent in military life.”385 These targets 
end up strengthening the exclusionary social concept present in the military values versus 
civilian values. This approach by modeling and disaggregating realities (civilian versus 
military) does not allow an interpretation more closely related to the concepts of Tao, 
proposed by Lewis, or connected to fidelity to virtue and not to the law or legal ordinations, 
as presented by Toner. By offering a model to be followed, however, with clear examples 
of conduct, distinguishing the civilian reality from the military reality, the military 
organizational culture is strengthened. Then, it is clear that this discipline is useful 
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institutionally, but it would not be sufficient for the formation of universal military ethics, 
true to virtue. 
Thus, Civil-Military Education complements the ethical approach. The aim of the 
course is to help the student to conceptualize morals and civics, to identify the moral and 
civic duties of the citizen, to identify military social roles in the community, to explain the 
concepts of Nation and State, to explain the meaning of national symbols, and to sing 
hymns and patriotic songs, as well as the hymns and songs of the Aeronautics.386 With this, 
military values go through a process of legitimization, gaining the universal character to 
justify the posture of cultural and institutional preservation necessary to strengthen the 
military and to enable the efficiency and effectiveness of the military. 
Also, some disciplines that do not appear in the Course for Specialist Officers 
(CFOE) and Adaptation Internship for Officers (EAOF) courses are actually taught during 
the sergeant training course at the School of Aeronautical Specialist (EEAR). Since the 
military that are sent to the CFOE and Adaptation Internship for Officers (EAOF) are 
military personnel who attended the EEAR, this knowledge is present in the competences 
developed by the officers coming from these courses. One of these disciplines is Military 
History, pointed out by Gabriel as the basic knowledge around which the military 
curriculum must be built in order to provide accumulation of experience. Yet, much of the 
military history covered in the courses of CIAAR and SERENS focuses on the FAB. 
Although not sufficient to provide new experiences, this kind of approach, giving 
experience through the history of the Brazilian military, is far more conducive to fostering 
organizational culture and providing socialization through the presentation of military 
heroes and iconic military campaigns into the history of the nation. 
Likewise, Military Campaign or Military Camp, intended to teach military camp 
techniques, survival, and progression in the field, for example, is practiced in all officer 
courses. According to the PPOA analysis, even in QOCON, whose purpose is “to fill, in 
temporarily, in peacetime, lapses existing in the structure of COMAER Military 
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Organizations, not filled by the Commissioned Officers,” these disciplines are taught.387 In 
other words, the functions provided by Temporary Officers are exercised outside the 
Theater of Operations—not related to war, battle, and combat. With this, it is deduced that 
the contact of these officers with real operational activities, linked to more combative 
actions, if they occur, will be carried out in the activities of guard and security, the 
guarantee of law and order, support to the population in public calamities, and medical-
hospital actions. 
On the other hand, every FAB Junior Officer is involved in activities related to 
guard and security through a shift called Officer-of-Day. In this role, the officer on duty is 
responsible for leading a staff of military men for 24 hours in the process of guarding the 
buildings and facilities of the FAB, controlling the access of people and using force, if 
necessary, to approach suspects and to neutralize threats. Thus, the military education 
course of the QOCON should focus on the constabulary force profile established by 
Janowitz, dispensing disciplines related to the performance of functions in times of war, 
with emphasis on police actions. Continuing to teach survival techniques such as how to 
obtain water and fire, for examplealthough useful for the development of organizational 
values linked to the institution’s end-activity, warshould not occupy a space in the 
curriculum that could be better used to develop other areas. Activities related to the use of 
tactical techniques and the study of military history—especially those historical episodes 
related to irregular warfare, hybrid warfare, public safety, and actions in calamities—
should have priority. 
The disciplines of Military Safety and Safety Exercises, respectively theory and 
practice of activities related to the guard and security of facilities, focus precisely on the 
profile of the constabulary force. This education and training package only exists in its 
entirety in the Adaptation Stage for Engineers Officers (EAOEAR), Adaptation Course for 
Doctors, Dentists, and Pharmacists (CAMAR / CADAR / CAFAR), Chaplain Education 
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and Adaptation Internship (EIAC), and Support Officers Adaptation Internship (EAOAp) 
courses. In Course for Specialist Officers (CFOE) and AFA courses it does not exist, in 
Adaptation Internship for Officers EAOF only the practical part, and in QOCON only the 
theoretical part. Although security and guard activities are carried out by sergeants 
throughout their careers, before these military members join the CFOE and EAOF, the 
leadership profile of a security team would undoubtedly require a revision of the concept 
and new learning, linked to the performance of duties as officers. 
Another factor that should be considered in curriculum analysis are the activities 
that make up the informal curriculum, as defined by Kohlberg,388 and echoed by 
Janowitz,389 McCloy and Clover,390 and Toner.391 Activities linked mainly to the period of 
adjustment to military life are developed in a planned way but are not directly addressed in 
the curriculum. In this regard, the QOCON curriculum refers to “appropriate learning 
experiences within and outside the classroom, summed of effective guidance, control, and 
ongoing indoctrination on the part of instructors.”392 
In line with Castro’s and Leal’s thinking, this initial period of adjustment lends 
itself mainly to promoting the socialization of the individual, incorporating him or her fully 
into the institution.393 Indeed, at this stage of the process of education of FAB officers, 
rituals, symbols, and heroes are very important for the perpetuation of specific military 
legends that will foster the desired institutional values for the character and moral 
formation of future officers. Thus, activities such as the cutting the hair,394 quartering or 
temporary boarding, for example, promote, respectively, the loss of individuality and the 
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disconnection from the civilian identity, through collectivism and abrupt isolation.395 The 
use of the uniform could contribute to the development of esprit de corps; the nocturnal 
training and intense activities with reduced hours of rest could help build the sense of duty 
that demands a military person’s self-sacrifice. Castro himself quotes Janowitz to establish 
a parallel between the period known as Beast Barracks at West Point and the period of 
adjustment existing in Brazilian military academies, demonstrating that the intensity of this 
phase lends itself to a purpose of converting ideas and thoughts to the ethics of the 
organization.396 An important addition is that within this informal curriculum, mainly 
during orientation weeks, chaplaincy actions aimed at maximizing belief in absolute values 
should be introduced in planning in order to make use of this educational fact.397 
Therefore, some of these activities imposed on the students, or actions taken by 
those responsible for each one of the courses, are developed without specific regulation of 
the DIRENS. Rather, it is the responsibility of each Organization of Education (OE) to 
promote this standardization, according to each OE’s own criteria. Even if these standard 
practices are not part of the curriculum of each course, they should be regulated by 
DIRENS, which would establish minimum standards to be considered during the planning 
and execution of the courses and internships, as well as during the orientation period. 
Questions such as “What is the haircut pattern?” and “What activities should be developed 
in a nocturnal training?” are examples of tactical issues that should be left to schools and 
SERENS to decide. However, DIRENS should enforce rules like the required haircut and 
minimum period of quartering, for example, in all military education courses under its 
responsibility, aiming at standardization in the process of ethics construction, at the same 
time strengthening the organizational culture. 
C. CONCLUSION 
It is necessary for formal and informal military curricula to be constructed in a way 
that minimizes possible “cultural contamination” of the institutional social organization by 
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the occupational one. The promotion of military personnel with a profile of manager, in 
order to balance the technical approach with the fighter approach, would be one of the 
preventive measures, as Janowitz states,398 to balance the desired and necessary technical 
profile of the temporary officers with the profile of the warrior, more present in the 
commissioned officers’ behavior. At the same time, the three dimensions of the 
professional military expressed by Huntington399—expertise, responsibility, and 
corporateness—must be developed in a balanced way in military education courses within 
all organizations belonging to SISTENS. For this balance to be achieved, it is essential to 
promote universal ethics400 and to exalt symbols, heroes, and great military achievements 
to build a morally strong and cohesive military organization.401 
A profile of the constabulary force, as theorized by Janowitz,402 meets the need to 
maintain a robust institutional profile while preparing career officers for a pattern of future 
combat linked to hybrid war,403 and enabling temporary officers to carry out their 
operational duties related to guard and security, which are primarily police duties. The 
FAB’s combat profile focused on hybrid warfare would also be a strong driver of 
effectiveness, helping to reduce bureaucracy and increase its legitimacy in society.404 
A clearer and more directive position of DIRENS is even more critical in the 
educational course for officers of QOCON, as the number of temporary military personnel 
has been increasing in recent years—and will continue to increase in the years to come—
and this is the course with the shortest duration. The institutional profile should take 
precedence over the occupational profile, while the technical approach should be balanced 
with the approach focused on combat. The curriculum should be centered on military 
history, with an emphasis on irregular warfare and hybrid warfare. From these foundations, 
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an improved curriculum can be made for both QOCON and other military education 
courses in the Brazilian Air Force, something that will be the focus of the next and last 




The members of the Brazilian Armed Forces can be considered professionals when 
they possess expertise, responsibility, and corporateness, focused on a specific jurisdiction 
that permits the FAB to attain social legitimacy. To permit liberal values and values of 
business within military institutions has a dangerous effect. Social transformations could 
affect the integrity of the occupational social organization, interfering with the essence of 
the armed forces and reducing the institution’s level of responsibility, corporateness, and 
effectiveness. Considering that the occupational organizational profile comes together with 
technological evolution, the FAB should prepare manager officers capable of balancing the 
organizational culture and technical curricula, as well as promoting new technologies. 
Through the veneration of heroes and historical episodes, rites, and symbology, traditions 
are incorporated into the barracks, perpetuating a long-established ethic. Moreover, 
integrating moral education into technical-professional education is essential. Finally, to 
reduce bureaucracy and increase effectiveness, the educational process must assume a 
constabulary force profile, preparing the FAB to engage in hybrid war, to be used in 
conventional and irregular warfare. 
Due to the high degree of complexity of the military task, military education must have 
priority in the FAB planning. Only the educational process can prepare leaders for the conduct 
of wars. Since its last experience in regular warfare was in World War II, the FAB has been 
used only for domestic security. The easiest way to close this gap in experience is through an 
educational system based on military history and case studies, as well as military personnel 
exchanges and joint missions. At the same time, the moral standard must remain unchanged 
throughout the entire process of adapting the expertise of the armed forces. Thus, through the 
experiences shared by other armed forces and other nations, the objective of the FAB ought to 
be to promote the development of the high moral standard of its officers. 
In the process of developing the organizational culture, the FAB must consider 
universal moral values common to several cultures around the globe and throughout 
history. Since these values are the origin of ethics, the FAB must assume the role of 
guardian of ethics in the state and incorporate these ethical standards through an organized 
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educational process. Adopting those values counteracts the social pressure to equate 
military professionals with their “equivalents” in civil society. Due to the singularity of 
military institutions, their values, and their mission, the FAB must avoid incorporating 
values, techniques, or practices from civilian society without adapting them to the military 
reality. The FAB’s goal must be to guide its personnel, mainly its officers, to reach the 
post-conventional level of moral reasoning. This will permit them to distinguish a righteous 
law of an unjust one. 
Many of the traditions of the FAB were created to strengthen specific moral values 
in periods of history when these values were threatened by cultural transformations in 
society. The primary function of a military course must be to inculcate values and socialize 
the members of the armed forces. Thus, the military’s educational process must focus on 
highlighting all the traditional narrative that guides the future armed forces personnel from 
their individualistic civilian lives to become subsumed within a collective military body. 
Techniques that should be integrated into military courses focus on episodes in history that 
enhance institutional values, use symbols that embody military ethics, encourage attitudes 
that symbolize a break with civilian life, or exalt national heroes who represent and 
incorporate the desired mindset. 
A. CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO TEMPORARY OFFICERS’ 
COURSES 
Since the courses that prepare Temporary Officers in the FAB are the courses with 
the shortest duration and the number of temporary military personnel is increasing, all 
efforts to adjust the Brazilian military educational process must concentrate on those 
courses first. After analyzing each of the disciplines that compose the course for the 
Temporary Officers, and contrasting them with disciplines studied in other officer’s 
courses and with the theories seen throughout this thesis, it is recommended that a series 
of changes be made to improve the quality of the professionals provided to FAB. Military 
Campaign, although it is a useful discipline for the development of some important values 
related to military ethos, must be remodeled to meet a technical profile required by a 
constabulary force. It is clear that employing temporary military personnel in a Theater of 
Operations, where survival techniques are essential, should not be the target of this course. 
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The ability to operate from a military camp in operations during public calamities, or even 
during actions linked to domestic security, are the scenarios in which these officers will 
act. Thus, the gains concerning institutional values and adequate technical training could 
be balanced if Temporary Officers were educated and trained in this type of scenario. 
Similarly, because often only the FAB can reach regions affected by catastrophic events 
such as natural disasters, the FAB would benefit from knowledge of first aid. This 
knowledge could ensure the survival of civilians and companions until those displaced can 
be relocated to regions with more significant resources.  
About the discipline Military Ethics for Temporary Officers, the focus should be 
on professional military ethics in balance with the ethics of values, with no emphasis on 
ethical business concepts. The discipline of ethics must compose the military field, and the 
concept of universal values—from which military ethics is a source—should be 
emphasized, incorporating Junior Officer’s Behavior and Civil-Military Education as a 
complement for the sake of behavioral illustration. The discipline History of the Brazilian 
Air Force must be maintained, but it should be added to general military history. Further, 
it should emphasize the formation of military values and the use of the FAB in various 
nations, including hybrid missions—regular and irregular warfare—and in relief activities 
during disaster relief. In addition, the disciplines of Military Mobilization and Security 
Exercises should be introduced into the Temporary Officers’ curriculum, with an emphasis 
on a constabulary force. Finally, yet in the QOCON curriculum, the discipline Leadership 
should be incorporated into the military field, and the focus should be on military 
leadership, not theories and techniques based on business leadership. For this, a good 
bibliography on military leadership is essential. 
B. CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO THE CAREER OFFICERS’ 
COURSES 
Based on the same comparative analysis done to determine the changes to be applied 
in the course for Temporary Officers, changes can also be made in the Career Officers’ courses. 
To begin, the First-Aid discipline must be extended to all courses. Next, the Military Campaign 
discipline must be maintained with emphasis on the Theater of Operations, in particular. This 
emphasis is paramount as a key role of the air force end-activity, war, is played by these 
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officers. Since the discipline Military History should be the core of military education in which 
experiences are acquired and the organizational culture is strengthened, the recommendations 
made for the improvement of the course of the QOCON are also valid for all other courses. In 
this respect, AFA courses are the ones that need less adjustment since they already have a very 
extensive approach to military history. They are lack only in one regard: they need to 
harmonize the discipline with the events and characters of Brazilian history that can foster 
desired institutional values, while some emphasis must be placed on hybrid warfare and uneven 
warfare in other nations. In the specific case of the CFOE and EAOF, the revision of the 
military history curriculum should occur in the course for sergeants in the EEAR, which is the 
source of the students in these courses. 
C. CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO BOTH TYPES OF OFFICERS’ 
COURSES 
The teaching of military ethics, the disciplines connected to guard and security, and 
the composition of the informal curriculum are three features within military courses that 
can be considered common to all courses, following LeBoeuf’s recommendation, and are 
mostly linked to the shaping of the organizational culture and the constabulary force 
profile. Thus, these characteristics must be developed in a standardized way to homogenize 
the professional profile of the officers who will compose the first positions of the officers’ 
circle after the educational process. 
Disciplines such as Military Profession, Civil-Military Education, and Military 
Doctrine can be incorporated into the discipline Military Ethics, which in addition to 
dealing with professional ethics must also include the ethics of values. The development 
of the concepts of universal ethics and the development of moral judgment seek to move 
students to the post-conventional level pointed out by Kohlberg. Thus, the application of 
the Moral Competence Test (MCT)405 or other tools developed to assess moral judgment 
or competence, at the time of entering the military course and throughout the education 
                                                 
405 According to George Lind, creator of the MCT, moral competence is the ability to solve problems and 
conflicts on the basis of moral principles through thinking and discussion, instead of through violence, deceit, 
or bowing down to others. Lind attests that MCT measures a particular aspect of this ability, namely the 
ability to judge arguments for and against a controversial decision on the basis of their moral quality, instead 
of on the basis of their opinion agreement or other non-moral attributes.  
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process, is essential for the improvement of the curriculum. In fact, procedures to identify 
the degree of moral judgment of an individual do not exist in the FAB, and even in Brazil 
as a whole, they are also rare. Then, use of this technique to aid the education process opens 
a range of research opportunities and new theses to validate the tools of moral judgment or 
tactics of moral education performed in Organizations of Education. 
Military Security and Security Exercises, two disciplines dealing with guard and 
security, include developing techniques for approaching suspects and notions of close 
combat and self-defense, for example, which help to build knowledge and techniques that 
must be mastered by all Junior Officers in the exercise of their duties as Officer-of-Day. 
Because of this, their presence in all curricula is also indispensable. Finally, as mentioned 
earlier, linking the discipline of Leadership to the military field, emphasizing military 
leadership, helps reinforce the institutional profile and downplay values related to an 
occupational profile. Replacing occupationalism with the technical ability necessary for 
the development of competencies of the officers is essential within a constabulary force. 
Finally, planning military courses should take into account the informal curriculum 
that helps to develop organizational culture. Thus, personnel policies must be constructed 
to motivate the educators responsible for conducting the disciplines to adopt behaviors that 
embody the values that are intended to be developed in the students. If education should 
be a priority activity in the FAB, and if the informal curriculum is directly affected by 
personnel policy, then the military instructors who make up SISTENS courses should be 
chosen according to the values they embody. At the same time, they should receive 
organizational incentives to carry out their activities in OEs, sharing these values with 
future officers. Thus, SERENS, although not a military organization, but a section within 
the SEREPs, should receive different attention in the composition of its personnel, with 
instructors capable of representing the institutional values in a faithful and committed way. 
Likewise, just as military schools make use of symbols and rites to reinforce the ethical 
concepts being conveyed in classrooms and during instruction, SERENS environments 
should emphasize symbols and ceremonies that point directly to personalities of Brazilian 
military history and to the great achievements of the military in the past. That practice will 
help to personify the organizational culture and reinforce the socialization of the new 
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officers. The SERENS chiefs, or the SEREPS chiefs, according to what Janowitz has 
emphasized, should embody the profile of the military man as a warrior, in order to serve 
as a model for those being educated in those organizations. 
Thus, the necessary adjustment to military disciplines in FAB’s military courses for 
officers are summarized in Table 3. The new disciplines are in italics and underlined. The 
disciplines that must be removed or incorporated in other disciplines are shown with 
strikethrough markings. It is important to highlight that several changes also must happen outside 
of the curricula, in the planning and organization of those courses, as previously mentioned. 
Table 3. New Military Curricula for Officers’ Courses 
CAREER OFFICERS TEMPORARY OFFICERS 
AFA CIAAR SERENS 
CFO 
(AV/INT/INF) 
EAOEAER / EAIC / 
EAOAp / 
CAMAR/CADAR/CAFAR 
CFOE EAOF QOCON 
First Aid First Aid First Aid First Aid First Aid 
































Intelligence Intelligence Intelligence Intelligence Intelligence 
Civil-military 
Behavior Civil-Military Education — — 
Civil-Military 
Education 
Military Doctrine — — — — 







Profession Military Profession — — — 











course in the 
EEAR) 
Military History 
Parachuting — — — — 
Survival — — — — 
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CAREER OFFICERS TEMPORARY OFFICERS 
AFA CIAAR SERENS 
CFO 
(AV/INT/INF) 
EAOEAER / EAIC / 
EAOAp / 
CAMAR/CADAR/CAFAR 
CFOE EAOF QOCON 
Military 



































— Armed Forces Structure —  Armed Forces 








— — Flight Safety — Flight Safety 
Military Security Military Security Military Security 
Military 
Security Military Security 





Leadership Leadership (out of the military field) 
Leadership 










— — — — Military Hymns and Songs 
— Search and Rescue (EAOAp only) — — — 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
In short, various theoretical premises drawn from three distinct areas—
professionalism, ethics, and education—associated with the historical construction of the 
organizational culture of the FAB highlight several aspects of the FAB military courses 
that can be improved. First and foremost, the PPOA needs to be remodeled to introduce 
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the constabulary force concept for all specialties and include competencies tied to hybrid 
warfare and irregular warfare, distinguishing between Temporary Officers who would not 
fight in a regular war scenario, and Career Officers, who would be involved in all scenarios. 
Likewise, military ethics concepts should use the moral codes present in DCA 11–45 (Air 
Force 100) and MCA 909–1 (PFV) as a reference for working on more universal concepts 
of ethics, linking the moral loyalty of officers directly to virtue rather than to codes, which 
would raise the officers’ moral judgment to the post-conventional level. Furthermore, 
technical competencies and combat competencies must be managed in a way that protects 
institutional values from being superseded by occupational values. Finally, the process of 
improving moral judgment should be the target of future research in the area of military 
ethics teaching. Such research could focus on the implementation of tools for measuring 
moral judgment, in particular, and on providing concrete data to improve the educational 
system of the FAB. 
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APPENDIX A.  BRAZILIAN MILITARY HISTORY FROM THE 
EMPIRE TO THE OLD REPUBLIC 
The first years of the newly consolidated nation, after the arrival of King Dom 
João VI and the Portuguese royal family406 in Rio de Janeiro in 1808, were marked by 
the necessity to construct a powerful army to sustain the government. At that time the 
first military academies were created, such as the Real Academy for Guardas-Marinha 
(the first rank in the Brazilian Navy), in 1808, and the Military Academy of Rio de 
Janeiro, in 1810. While the navy was formed from an aristocracy of officers, the Army 
did not follow the same way. Author Frank McCann, in his book Soldados da Pátria 
affirms that the ranks were filled by criminals, poor people, and any kind of social slag 
at that time.407 Smallman adds that “many officers came from poorer provinces, and it 
was not uncommon for them to come from families of declining fortune seeking to 
ensure that their sons would not sink into poverty and disgrace.”408 From this situation 
arose a worrisome domestic heterogeneity and a lack of identity with the dominant 
classes. Yet, the same army was designed to serve as an instrument of order defending 
the privilege of the slaveholding elites.409  
The landholding class, however, did not trust the army, creating tension 
between the Brazilian military and the political elites.410 Brazilian politics were 
governed by a small population of social and political elites. Its members controlled 
the land and the slaves, the main means of measuring wealth during the empire. While 
new groups (such as industrialists) could gain wealth, they could not join the ruling 
class in Brazil solely on the basis of this wealth.411 These elites maintained a weak 
central state to ensure the autonomy of the state governments, to exclude the general 
                                                 
406 The monarch at the time was Dom Joao VI of the Bragança dynasty. This dynasty reigned in 
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407 McCann, 29. 
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411 Smallman, 11. 
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population from politics, and to maintain slavery.412 The contrast between those 
powerful classes and a segregated army characterized by unprofessional behavior 
among the lowest ranks, sparking public disorder and violence in the capital city, was 
evident.413 
The situation intensified in 1831, after a war against Argentina—known as the 
Cisplatina War, which happened from 1925 to 1928 to decide what nation would rule 
Cisplatina, modern Uruguay—when the government resolved to reduce the size of the army 
and to diminish the threat against the elites’ power.414 Another consequence was the 
creation of a national guard in 1831. The ranks in the national guard, composed of members 
of the dominant classes, were responsible for protecting the cities and imposing internal 
law, under the authority of the Minister of Justice.415 The elites’ intent was to use the 
national guard to counterbalance the power of the army and to ensure their power. Because 
the elites feared the army, they provided the national guard with more resources than the 
army, which also lamented the fact that it had been forced to accept poor men (usually 
black men) in the ranks. By contrast, the national guard recruited the rich and the 
educated.416 This inequality increased the racial division between the two organizations 
and, consequently, between the leading class and the armed forces.417 In this moment, a 
gap between the military and the politicians started to take form.  
Nevertheless, the government’s attempt to reduce military prerogatives could not 
be sustained because of the Paraguayan War—also known as the War of Triple Alliance. 
The Paraguayan War, which occurred between 1864 and 1870, was the longest-running 
and deadliest international conflict in South America.418 Paraguay lived under a 
dictatorship of Solano Lopez, who used the state as a personal possession for a perpetuation 
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of his family in power.419 In October 1864, Brazilian troops invaded Uruguayan territory 
in support of the Colorado Party in a civil war against the Blanco Party, the party of the 
government.420 As the Paraguayan government supported the Blanco Party the following 
month, the Brazilian civilian vessel Marquês de Olinda was imprisoned shortly after 
leaving the port of Asuncion in Paraguay and, at the end of December, Paraguayan troops 
attacked the Brazilian state of Mato Grosso, surprising the Empire.421 Around 7,700 
Paraguayan soldiers easily commanded the Imperial Army’s 875 soldiers and the slightly 
less than 3,000 national guards who were unfit for combat. With its rearguard to the north, 
Solano López planned to advance over the Rio Grande do Sul toward Uruguay, where his 
forces would defeat Brazilian troops of just under 10,000 soldiers (the total manpower of 
the Imperial Army was 18,000 men). This victory would subject the Brazilian Empire to 
the Paraguayan government.422 The incapacity of the national guard to actuate and to 
eliminate the threat of General Solano Lopez eventually led to an increase in the 
prerogatives of the Brazilian Armed Forces. The Brazilian Army increased not only its 
number of soldiers but also its number of black soldiers; this helped to enlarge the distance 
between the elite and the military.423 For this reason, with the end of the conflict, the elites 
in the legislature rapidly cut the military’s budget and enlistment. To army leaders, the 
rapid cuts in their organization appeared to be a betrayal. The army doubted both the 
willingness and the capability of traditional elites to solve Brazil’s problems. It was during 
this period that Brazilian officers began to think of the army as the “nation’s savior,” which 
became an important aspect of the military’s depiction of itself.424 The Brazilian Armed 
Forces finished the war strengthened, but resentful because of measures adopted by the 
government that prejudiced them.425 This kind of treatment received from the government 
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expanded to some areas of society, creating a hostile environment for the veterans of the 
Paraguayan War.426 
At the same time, the attitudes of the son of Dom João VI, the new Brazilian 
Emperor Dom Pedro I,427 were not so different since he also mistrusted the army but used 
it against his enemies when convenient. Author Frank McCann affirms that the monarchy 
used the army several times to maintain cohesion in the country.428 The emperor dissolved 
the Constituent Assembly in 1823 in what became known as “the Night of the Agony.”429 
D. Pedro I, with military aid, ordered a siege on the building where the constituent deputies 
were assembled. Many were eventually arrested and then exiled. This decision sparked a 
rebellion in the northeast, where a series of provinces came together to establish the 
“Confederation of the Equator.” The emperor successfully put down this uprising by 
November 1824.430 
The consequence of this constantly shifting relation between the authorities and the 
army created military officers who were riddled by resentment; they started to see 
themselves as the only ones capable of breaking a failed order of political games and 
constructing a new one. Abolitionists and liberal dissidents grew inside the army, also 
motivated by a positivist ideology that came from France.431 They had a sense of not 
belonging to the governmental structure.432 McCann also testifies to this sense of non-
belonging that plagued the army. Nevertheless, McCann’s statements demonstrate that 
these feelings were more motivated by the role played by the army, acting as a nationalist 
institution responsible for consolidating the Brazilian territory and the population, and 
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creating a sense of “Brazilianness.”433 At same time, McCann talks about the shortage of 
officers in the political leadership generating a sense of detachment from the civilian elites 
and disengagement from the government.434 In fact, McCann argues that this sense of 
alienation was not due to the army’s view of itself as different and technically and morally 
superior to civilian authority, but because the army was like an entity that “hovered over 
other institutions,” filling a vacuum that the government could not fill because the 
government still had a regional character. Not even the Roman Catholic Church, which had 
an international organizational culture, could play that role. Only the Brazilian Army could 
because it was national and nationalistic at the same time.435 
Then, Brazil entered a period of regency since D. Pedro I’s son was only six years 
old when his father abdicated from the throne and returned to Portugal under enormous 
social pressure.436 Thus, D. Pedro II would have to wait until 18 to be crowned. Between 
1832 and 1845, the provisory government of regents were faced with five significant 
rebellions, some of which had a strongly regional character: The Cabanos War in 
Pernambuco (1832–35); the Cabanagem War in Pará (1835–40); the Sabinada in Bahia 
(1837–38); the Balaiada in Maranhão (1838–41); and the Farrapos War in the Rio Grande 
do Sul (1836–45).437 The army did not benefit from this period of turmoil, in part because 
military officers—army officers who resented the military reforms of the 
1830sparticipated in many of the uprisings. Despite the military’s role in ensuring the 
government’s survival, old patterns of mutual mistrust endured.438 
The army’s unwillingness to support the military organization exacerbated a 
relationship of mutual suspicion between the elites and the military, leading to the 
military’s involvement in the future of society throughout the First Republic (1889–1930). 
In the words of Smallman, “The army’s perception of itself as the nation’s savior, its fear 
                                                 
433 McCann, 11. 
434 McCann, 29. 
435 McCann, 10–11. 
436 Smallman, 13–14. 
437 Smallman, 14. 
438 Smallman, 14. 
110 
of competing institutions, and its difficult relationship with civilian elites, all had their roots 
in this period.”439 In this aspect, McCann speaks of the “Army’s modernizing ideology,” 
which collided with the interests of the regional agrarian oligarchies, interested in 
maintaining their status quo.440 
Then, the first mix between military and politics happened. In 1889, the event 
known in Brazil as the “Proclamation of the Republic,” took place. It was, in fact, a military 
coup that put an end to the monarchist regime. Some leaders of the republican movement 
were linked to the Brazilian Army, such as Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Constant. 
Republicans were intimately influenced by Auguste Comte’s positivism,441 implying the 
idea of a strong, anti-slavery, anti-monarchical,442 and laic state supported by a rational 
society planned by technocrats. For the coup against the monarchy to be successful, the 
republicans needed the support of the main military authority of the time, Marshal Deodoro 
da Fonseca, since the Brazilian Navy was aristocratic and loyal to the monarchy. 
Embodying the positivist ideology, Deodoro wrote the princess Isabel (daughter of Pedro 
II) to request that the army not be used to capture slaves in flight. A short time after, on 
May 13, 1888, Princess Isabel abolished slavery on behalf of her father.443 Thus, because 
the Brazilian agrarian economy deeply depended on slavery, military abolitionism served 
to exacerbate the difficult relationship between the army and the civilian leaders of the 
landowning class,444 at the same time that it dissolved some alliances between the emperor 
and the oligarchy. 
Nevertheless, Deodoro was monarchist445 and a personal friend of the emperor D. 
Pedro II. To convince Deodoro of the need to overthrow the prevailing order, the 
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republicans used the argument that the decisions of the Prime Minister of Pedro II, 
Viscount of Ouro Preto, would cause several losses to the army, which already was in bad 
condition at that time. The viscount was a liberal and planned to reduce the influence of 
the armed forces, cutting the budget, sending the army to the countryside, and improving 
the power of the national guard. Also, the republicans planted the information that, even if 
Ouro Preto was overthrown, a former personal enemy of Deodoro, Gaspar da Silveira 
Martins, would be chosen to replace him. Considering that republicans represented only 
one-fifth of the officers, but there were a lot of other small factions inside the army, and 
there was no consensus about the political program,446 Deodoro gathered a few hundred 
soldiers and advanced against the city of Rio de Janeiro with the goal of overthrowing the 
ministry of Ouro Preto. 
This was the end of the monarchy and the beginning of the “military republic” of 
Brazil. It is interesting to note that the end of the monarchy, although it entailed significant 
social changes, was not characterized as a revolution. For McCann, a revolution would be 
a popular uprising that changes the nature of government and society.447 Although the 
events of 1889 were not necessarily popular as they were unleashed within the armed forces 
and modified the regime, they left the social and economic system almost intact,448 and 
thus, revolution would not be the adequate definition. Independent of this definition, 
however, changes occurred. Brazilian historians refer to it as the Sword Republic, a period 
in which Brazil was ruled by marshals Deodoro da Fonseca and Floriano Peixoto between 
1889 and 1894. This was also the period when the first civilian president, Prudente de 
Morais, took office. It is a time characterized as a military dictatorship.449 During this 
period, the popular uprisings and the repression of resistance forces that wanted to restore 
the monarchy and the power to Emperor Dom Pedro II were common. After becoming 
president, Deodoro da Fonseca dissolved the National Congress by decree on November 
                                                 
446 Hahner, 174–175. 
447 McCann, 20. 
448 McCann, 17. 
449 Francisco Martinho, Democracia e Ditadura no Brasil [Democracy and Dictatorship in Brazil], 
(Rio de Janeiro, EdUERJ, 2006), 33. 
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3, 1891. Then, to complete the coup, with another order the president instituted a state of 
siege in Brazil, authorizing the army to surround the Chamber and Senate and to arrest 
opposition politicians. 
Almost two decades later, another process started in 1905 and peaked in 1913, when 
some groups inside the Brazilian Army tried to move the armed forces away from political 
involvement. Before reaching its conclusion in 1919, the movement sought to change the 
focus of internal (maintenance of republican institutions) to external (National Defense).450 
The Brazilian government sent troops to Germany in 1905, and then brought a French 
mission to Brazil in 1919 to try to change the focus. Nevertheless, military involvement 
with politics, playing the role of saviors, had increased to the point that a myth about a 
communist rebellion within the army arose.451 This myth was used for building unity 
within the armed forces with the objective of saving the Republic from the incompetence 
of politicians. The ideology of fear of social collapse eventually separates the army and 
civil society,452 and has helped foster within the barracks a role of the armed forces as a 
national development institution support.453 According to McCann, during this period the 
army was the “core of the developing Brazilian State” and was the only truly national and 
non-regional institution.454 Because of this, one of the Brazilian Army’s major missions 
evolved to build state infrastructure.455 
                                                 
450 Smallman, 33. 
451 Smallman, 41 and 54. 
452 Smallman, 42. 
453 Smallman, 66. 
454 McCann, 10. 
455 McCann, 14. 
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APPENDIX B. AERONAUTICS EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM 
(SISTENS) 
This appendix provides an overview of the Aeronautics Educational System 
(SISTENS) and specifically details what branches and institutions make up SISTENS, 
what their functions are, and what the systemic relationship between them is. The appendix 
also identifies which categories of officers make up the Brazilian Air Force and their 
respective education process. 
The normative document governing SISTENS is the Aeronautical Command 
System Norm (NSCA) 37–1.456 This document was created with the purpose of 
“establishing the organization, regulating the functioning and defining the responsibilities 
of the bodies of the Aeronautical Education System.”457 The Brazilian Air Force (FAB) 
organizes its centralized educational system in a Directorate of Education (DIRENS),458 a 
military organization based in the federal capital, Brasília, under the command of a general 
officer of the penultimate rank, a Major-Brigadier, and directly subordinate to the General 
Personnel Command (COMGEP).459 It is the responsibility of DIRENS “to determine the 
execution of the educational activities in a systemic way, in order to ensure the continued 
effectiveness of the SISTENS component organizations.”460 Figure 1 depicts DIRENS 
position within the FAB’s administrative structure. 
 
                                                 
456 Comando da Aeronáutica, Sistema de Ensino da Aeronáutica [Aeronautics Educational System], 
NSCA 37–1 (Brasília, DF: Comando da Aeronáutica, 2018). 
457 Comando da Aeronáutica, 5. 
458 Comando da Aeronáutica, 8. 
459 Comando da Aeronáutica, Regulamento da Diretoria de Ensino [Regulation of the Directorate of 
Education], ROCA 21–104 (Brasília, DF: Comando da Aeronáutica, 2018), 7. 
460 Comando da Aeronáutica, Sistema de Ensino da Aeronáutica [Aeronautics Educational System], 
NSCA 37–1, 5. 
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This figure shows where the Directorate of Education (DIRENS) is situated in FAB’s 
administrative structure. It is in the second hierarchical line, under the General Personnel 
Command subordination, under command of a three-star General. 
Figure 1. FAB’s Organizational Chart.461  
The mission of DIRENS is to “plan, manage and control educational activities 
related to the training and post-training of Aeronautical Command personnel.”462 Five 
Organizations of Education (OE) are directly subordinate to DIRENS: Air Force University 
(UNIFA), the Preparatory School to Cadets-of-Air (EPCAR), the School of Aeronautical 
Experts (EEAR), the Aeronautical Instruction and Adaptation Center (CIAAR), and the 
Air Force Academy (AFA), as depicted in Figure 2. 
                                                 
461 Source: Rui Chagas Mesquita, “O Sistema de Ensino na Força Aérea Brasileira” [The Brazilian Air 
Force Education System] (presentantion, XV Congresso Acadêmico sobre Defesa Nacional, 2018), 
https://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/ensino_e_pesquisa/defesa_academia/cadn/palestra_cadn_xi/xv_cadn/
o_sistema_de_ensino_na_forca_aerea_brasileira.pdf. 
462 Comando da Aeronáutica, Regulamento da Diretoria de Ensino [Regulation of the Directorate of 
Education], ROCA 21–104, 7. 
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This figure shows the five Organizations of Education (OE) subordinate to DIRENS. The 
Air Force Academy and Aeronautical Instruction and Adaptation Center, organizations that 
educate career officers, are fourth and fifth from the left. 
Figure 2. Directorate of Education’s Organizational Chart.463 
SISTENS also has seven systemic educational bodies, which are the Regional 
Education Sections (SERENS), subordinate to the Aeronautics Personnel Recruitment and 
Training Services (SEREP).464 These systemic organizations are spread throughout the 
nation and, in addition to executing the education of Temporary Officers in their own 
regions, coordinate the execution of the courses for these military personnel in isolated 
military organizations within their jurisdiction, that is, those that are located in states where 
there is no SEREP. Thus, SERENS are not military organizations per se, but rather sections 
within the structures of the Aeronautical Recruitment and Personnel Services, 
administratively subordinate to SEREP but technically subordinate to DIRENS.465 The 
                                                 
463 Source: Rui Chagas Mesquita, “O Sistema de Ensino na Força Aérea Brasileira” [The Brazilian Air 
Force Education System] (presentantion, XV Congresso Acadêmico sobre Defesa Nacional, 2018), 
https://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/ensino_e_pesquisa/defesa_academia/cadn/palestra_cadn_xi/xv_cadn/
o_sistema_de_ensino_na_forca_aerea_brasileira.pdf. 
464 Comando da Aeronáutica, Sistema de Ensino da Aeronáutica [Aeronautics Educational System], 
NSCA 37–1, 11. 
465 Comando da Aeronáutica, 11. 
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SEREP, in turn, are subordinate to the Directorate of Personnel Administration of the 
Aeronautics (DIRAP), which like DIRENS, is under the General Personnel Command 
(COMGEP). 
 
This figure shows Directorate of Education (DIRENS) and Directorate of Personnel 
Administration of the Aeronautics (DIRAP), side by side. It is possible to see the seven 
Aeronautics Personnel Recruitment and Training Services (SEREP) under DIRAP and, 
between the seven Organizations of Education (OE) under DIRENS, the two organizations 
responsible for educating career officers: The Air Force Academy (AFA) and the 
Aeronautical Instruction and Adaptation Center (CIAAR). 
Figure 3. General Personnel Command’s Organizational Chart.466 
Among the OEs mentioned previously, two participate directly in the education of 
future “career officers”—those who will remain in the military profession until retirement: 
Air Force Academy (AFA) and Aeronautical Instruction and Adaptation Center (CIAAR). 
In the AFA there are three military courses, lasting four years, where the Aviators 
(CFOAV), Quartermasters (CFOINT), and Infantry officers (CFOINF) are educated and 
trained. Most of them will undergo “career courses” and will reach the rank of Colonel. 
Some of them will be selected for promotion to General. Only aviators reach the last rank 
                                                 
466 “Organograma, COMGEP” [Chart, COMGEP], Força Aérea Brasileira, last modified August 1, 
2018, http://www.fab.mil.br/organograma. 
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in the career, Lieutenant-Brigadier, becoming four-star Generals. The three courses receive 
young people between the ages of 18 and 23, coming directly from civilian education 
organizations through a Concurso Público.467 
In CIAAR the situation is a bit more complex. The organization is responsible for 
six military courses: the Adaptation Course for Doctors, Dentists, and Pharmacists 
(CAMAR / CADAR / CAFAR), the Adaptation Stage for Engineers Officers (EAOEAR), 
and the Support Officers Adaptation Internship (EAOAp), lasting 17 weeks; the Chaplain 
Education and Adaptation Internship (EIAC), and the Adaptation Internship for Officers 
(EAOF), with a duration of 13 weeks; and the Course for Specialist Officers (CFOE), 
lasting two years. Unlike the Air Force Academy (AFA) courses, these courses have older 
age groups due to the origin of their students. The CAMAR / CADAR / CAFAR, the 
EAOEAR, and the EAOAp, for example, receive undergraduate students with some 
professional experience from civilian universities. On the one hand, older professionals 
bring a more diverse background by adding more of their technical-professional 
experiences to the technical performance of their functions in the barracks. On the other 
hand, the socialization of older individuals who already have consolidated their moral 
judgment can be much more challenging than that of the post-adolescent boys entering 
military academies. So, if military ethics education is more difficult with older students, 
while their technical skills are not more diverse, the focus of courses geared toward older 
students should be the military disciplines. Despite the similarities, only the CAMAR and 
EAOEAR allow officers to reach the rank of three-star Generals. Another difference is that 
in addition to theological training, the Chaplain Education and Adaptation Internship 
(EIAC) requires a series of denominational ecclesiastical requirements since only religious 
authorities have the competence to verify the technical abilities of those professionals. 
Then, this means that these students already have extensive professional experience, since 
they come from churches and religious organizations with recognized social standing. The 
EAOF provides the Sergeants with the opportunity to become officers, to reach the position 
                                                 
467 Most of the work positions to be filled in government agencies must use this modality, where the 
candidates are evaluated in exams of specific knowledge, physical exams, and medical examinations, being 
classified according to performance in each stage. Those that are better classified occupy the vacancies 
offered. 
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of Captain within their specialties, through physical and medical tests and assessments. 
This raises the age group of this course, which has students with ample experience in the 
barracks. The Course for Specialist Officers is also intended for the enlisted personnel, 
with the difference that it can only be accessed after ten years of military service and allows 
the professional to reach the rank of Colonel. 
By contrast, there is a third category of officers, trained and educated by SERENS, 
who are not considered “career officers” but “Temporary Officers” and belong to the 
Specialty of Convoked Officers (QOCON). The main characteristic of this framework is 
the permanence in the armed forces for a maximum of eight years of service, based on an 
annually-reviewed contract. The human resources management policy at the FAB has been 
increasing the number of temporary officers based on two main aspects: on the one hand, 
employment opportunities for qualified and experienced professionals, and on the other, 
the diminishing of the payroll of inactive military personnel, since this number will 
decrease year after year after the continuous adding of temporary military personnel. It 
should be noted that QOCON officers are not required to do the Concurso Público like the 
other officers, but instead are selected through evaluation of their educational 
qualifications, when they are graded according to their performance on undergraduate, 
graduate, and post-graduate courses. Another relevant fact is the brevity of the education 
military course to which temporary officials are submitted: only 60 days. 
The following table provides a comparison of the different professional specialties 
of the FAB officers: 
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Table 4. Officers’ Military Courses in FAB. 
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The Aeronautical Command Manual (MCA) 36–7 – Professional Profile of the 
Aeronautical Officer (PPOA),468 is the document that guides the development of the 
                                                 
468 Comando da Aeronáutica, Perfil Profissional do Oficial da Aeronáutica [Professional Profile of 
Aeronautical Officers] (PPOA), MCA 36–7. 
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curricula of the military courses in the FAB. It is in the PPOA that the professional 
competencies of each of the officers’ specialties are described. Competencies are defined 
as the “clustering of related knowledge, skills and attitudes”469 performed in the fulfillment 
of a task. Attitudes are more linked to moral values and, therefore, to ethics, as can be 
inferred by comparing the following two definitions: 
Competencies include…motives, traits, self-concepts, attitudes or values, 
content knowledge, or cognitive or behavioral skills—any individual 
characteristic that can be measured or counted reliably and that can be 
shown to differentiate significantly between superior and average 
performers, or between effective and ineffective performers.470 
Competency…is a knowledge, skill, ability, or characteristic associated 
with high performance on a job, such as problem solving, analytical 
thinking, or leadership. Some definitions of a competency include motives, 
beliefs, and values.471 
  
                                                 
469 Scott Parry, “The Quest for Competencies,” Training 33, no. 7 (July 1996): 50, https://search-
proquest-com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/203398191/fulltextPDF/C28D7F8DE3634B4BPQ/
1?accountid=12702. 
470 Françoise Delamare and Jonathan Winterton, “What Is Competence?” Human Resource 
Development International 8, no. 1 (March 2005): 32, https://www-tandfonline-com.libproxy.nps.edu/doi/
full/10.1080/1367886042000338227?scroll=top&needAccess=true. 
471 Richard Mirable, “Everything You Wanted to Know about Competency Modeling,” Training & 
Development 51, no. 8 (August 1997): 75 http://web.b.ebscohost.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/
pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=a263794a-837d-4c69-8693-38eedaefe307%40pdc-v-sessmgr03. 
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